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1 Introduction 
 
Jean Monnet stated in the first meeting of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel 
Authority (hereinafter: the ECSC Court) on 10 December 1952 that "[f]or the first time there 
has been created a sovereign European Court. I foresee in it also a Supreme Federal 
European Court."1 In retrospect one can ask whether the judiciary in question really was a 
"European Court", considering that its jurisdiction at the time only covered six countries.2 
But today, 65 years later, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU), 
with its jurisdiction covering 28 European countries and a wide range of subject-matters 
touching the everyday life of the citizens, without a doubt is a "European Court".  
 
The structure of this institution is flexible, as it has, unlike that of the other main institutions 
of the EU, been changed several times over the years in a profound manner to meet the new 
challenges brought by expansions of the EU's area and of its powers. The latest reform, the 
examination of which is at the core of this thesis, was agreed by the legislator in December 
2015 and is still partly unfinished. Its background relates to the workload crisis that the 
General Court (hereinafter: GC) faced towards the end of the first decade of 2000. As a 
remedy the CJEU presented in 2011 a proposal to add the number of judges in the GC by 12. 
After a lengthy, cumbersome and highly politicised process the legislator together with the 
CJEU managed to find a compromise that consisted of a far more radical reform then the one 
originally proposed. The main elements of the reform are 1) the gradual doubling the number 
of judges at the GC by September 2019 and 2) the abolishment of the Civil Service Tribunal 
(hereinafter: CST).  
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine this reform, in many respects quite different 
from the previous ones. The reform has been the subject of unprecedented criticism covering 
both substantial and procedural issues. Although some of the critique might be exaggerated, 
the inevitable conclusion is that the addition of judges was excessive and that the abolition of 
                                                             
1 Tamm (2013), p. 18. 
2 Tamm (2013), p. 15.  
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the CST is a loss. But does this mean that the reform is doomed to be a failure or could the 
CJEU manage to turn it into a win? Although it is way too early to draw definitive 
conclusions, there are certain observations that can be made.  
 
To this end, before making a comprehensive overview of the latest reform and the process 
leading to it, the sections 2 and 3 will consist of the examination of the different 
modifications that the architecture of the judiciary of the CJEU has undergone before the 
latest reform, from the establishment of the court system in 1952 until the Lisbon Treaty. The 
evolution of the architecture of the CJEU will be presented in a chronological order and the 
reasons behind the modifications as well as their impacts are examined.  
 
The term "architecture" is used to describe the various modifications in the structure of the 
judiciary, such as the setting up of completely new courts and of adding the number of judges 
or advocates general. The most important changes in the internal organisation of the judiciary 
will also be presented, as they are often very closely linked to the changes in the external 
architecture, both in time and in substance.3 Also, the giving of new competences to the 
courts as well as the important shifts of competences between the different parts of the 
judiciary are mentioned when they are made as a part of a reform, as these alterations often 
form an essential part of a reform and alter the nature of the courts in question. National 
courts, when applying EU law, form a part of the judicial architecture of the EU. 
Nevertheless, they are left outside this thesis as this thesis, revolving around the CJEU as an 
institution.4 The same goes for the different boards of appeal of EU agencies and similar 
bodies. 
 
Section 4 presents the legislative process leading to the adoption of the latest reform 
describing in detail the different twists and turns of the project, important to fully understand 
the reform and its background. Section 5 will focus on the evaluation of this reform, 
presenting first an overview of the public as well as institutional and academic discussion 
                                                             
3 Changes in the internal architecture often either precede or follow changes in the external architecture or are 
made to avoid or to postpone them. 
4 Moreover, as the position of national courts has remained unchanged throughout the history of the court 
system, their inclusion in the examination would not have any added value. 
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surrounding the reform. The second part of this section is devoted to the examination of the 
possible measures that the CJEU and the GC, in particular, will have to undertake in the 
future as a result of the reform. Finally, the sixth and last section will present the conclusions 
and analyse the chances of the reform to succeed despite its shortcomings and the harsh 
criticism it has faced.  
 
The thesis has been made by using official sources such as legislative acts and provisions of 
primary law as well as the various preparatory documents related to them. Academic 
literature concerning the evolution of the structure of the CJEU has also been used. However, 
printed and social media have also been used as sources especially regarding the latest 
reform. The reform process was followed closely by the EU law blogosphere as well as the 
press in certain countries. The commentaries presented in the media provide valuable 
information on the process and help assessing the legitimacy and general acceptance of the 
reform and give valuable information on the process. Without the use of these sources the 
picture painted of the reform would be one-sided and simplified. 
 
 
2 From an ECSC Court to a two-level jurisdiction 
 
2.1 The early years – from an ECSC Court to a Court of Justice of the 
three Communities 
 
2.1.1 The ECSC Court 
 
The story of what today is the CJEU started with the entry into force of the Treaty of Paris5 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (hereinafter: ECSC) in 1952.6 This 
                                                             
5 The Treaty was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951 and entered into force on 23 July 1952. Concluded for a 
period of fifty years, it expired on 23 July 2002. 
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Treaty provided in its Article 7 for the establishment of the ECSC Court. The other three 
institutions were "a High Authority, assisted by a Consultative Committee", "a Common 
Assembly" and "a Special Council, composed of ministers". 
 
However, that the ECSC would be endowed with a Court was not self-evident. The first 
drafts of the so-called Schuman Plan namely provided only for a weak ad hoc appeal system 
for the ECSC and Jean Monnet was reluctant to the idea of creating a court.7 Nevertheless, 
apparently thanks to the German delegation emerged the idea of a permanent court that could 
solve different types of cases between the relevant actors, including natural and legal persons 
and that would balance the strong High Authority.8 And so begun the drafting of Treaty 
articles on the court and its jurisdiction.  
 
According to Article 31 of the ECSC Treaty the function of the ECSC Court was "to ensure 
the rule of law in the interpretation and application of the present Treaty and of its 
implementing regulations." By creating a Court, the founders of the ECSC wanted to show 
and to make sure that the new Community is based on democratic principles and the rule of 
law; the Court represented the new, European spirit where conflicts are solved by common 
institutions. Hence, the ECSC Court could be seen as part of the transitional justice after the 
Second World War, together with the founding of for instance the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) and the Italian and German Constitutional Courts.9  
 
The main responsibility was given to Maurice Lagrange, a member of the French Conseil 
d’Etat.10 Hence it was natural that the judicial structure of the ECSC Court was influenced by 
ideas derived from French administrative law with an advocate general as an independent 
legal advisor, and its working methods were also modelled on the procedures of the Conseil 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
6 Some have questioned whether the CJEU really is a continuity of the ECSC Court or whether the current 
Court was only born in 1958 when the ECSC Court became the Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the establishment of the ECSC Court signified the birth of what today is the 
CJEU. 
7 Arnull (2018), p. 2.  
8 Tamm (2013), pp. 16−17. 
9 Tamm (2013), pp. 12−14.  
10 Arnull (2018), p. 2. 
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d'Etat.11 The ECSC Court consisted of seven judges and two advocates general, appointed 
for six years by common agreement of the governments of the Member States from among 
persons of recognized independence and competence. There was one judge from every 
Member State, and a seventh seat necessary to avoid a tie. The first composition of the ECSC 
Court consisted of an Italian President, Belgian, French, German and Luxemburgish judges, 
two Dutch judges as well as a French advocate general and a German advocate general.12  
 
The ECSC Court was competent to annul the decisions and the recommendations of the High 
Authority13 and the acts of the Assembly and the Council.14 It also had jurisdiction to assess 
damages against the Community and to rule on the validity of acts of the High Authority or 
the Council when they have been contested in litigation before a national tribunal (the latter 
seems to be an early form of the preliminary reference procedure). The ECSC Treaty also 
included an infringement procedure.15 
 
The fact that the Court had (and still has) its seat in Luxembourg was more of a coincidence, 
as also the cities of Brussels and Liège were discussed in this context. Luxembourg was 
finally chosen, but only by a provisional arrangement which was not confirmed until at the 
Edinburgh European Council of 12 December 1992.16  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
11 Brown and Kennedy (2000), p. 1, Tamm (2013), p. 17 and Edward (1995), p. 539. 
12 The curia-website [https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_217426/en/]. 
13 Article 33(1) of the ECSC Treaty; "on the grounds of lack of legal competence, substantial procedural 
violations, violation of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or abuse of power." 
14 Article 38 of the ECSC Treaty; "on the grounds of lack of legal competence or substantial procedural 
violations". 
15 According to its Article 88 if the High Authority deemed that a Member State was "delinquent with respect to 
one of the obligations incumbent upon it by virtue of the present Treaty", it took note of the delinquency in a 
motivated decision after permitting the State concerned to present its views. The Member State concerned had 
the right to appeal this decision to the ECSC Court. 
16 The curia website [https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_44255/en/]. 
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2.1.2 The Court of Justice of the European Communities is born 
 
In 1957 the European Economic Community (hereinafter: EEC) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (hereinafter: Euratom) were created by the Treaties of Rome.17 Both new 
Communities were equipped with an institutional apparatus similar to that of the ECSC, 
including a Court of Justice.  
 
The provisions concerning the Court of the EEC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty were 
somewhat more elaborate than those in the ECSC Treaty. They included a full-fledged 
preliminary ruling procedure with a right for all national courts (and obligation in case of 
highest national courts) to present preliminary references both on validity and on 
interpretation of Treaties and secondary legislation.18 As is well known, this system, based on 
cooperation between the CJEC and the national courts became one of the cornerstones of the 
judicial activity of the CJEC. Another opportunity to ensure the consistency of law of the 
Communities and its uniform application would have been to institute a system whereby the 
decisions of national courts could have been applied to the CJEC. It seems clear that the 
system chosen, based on cooperation rather than hierarchical relation between the courts is 
more fruitful from the point of view of the courts, and quicker and better from the point of 
view of legal certainty for the litigants. 
 
To avoid multiplication of institutions the Member States agreed on a “Convention on 
Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities".19  According to this 
Convention a common "Court of Justice of the European Communities" (hereinafter: CJEC) 
replaced the Court created by the ECSC Treaty.20 In addition to the technical articles 
                                                             
17 The ECSC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty were signed in Rome on 25 March 1957 and entered into force on 
1 January 1958. 
18 Article 177 of the EEC Treaty and Article 150 of the Euratom Treaty. The preliminary ruling procedure is 
inspired by Italian law [Tamm (2013)] and was based on the ideas of the Italian former legal adviser to the High 
Authority, Nicola Catalano [Arnull (2018), p. 4].  
19 Signed in Rome 25 March 1957. 
20 The Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, Articles 3 and 4. According 
to this Convention also the Assembly was common to all three Communities, whereas the High Authority/the 
Commission (the EEC and the Euratom had a Commission instead of a High Authority) as well as the Councils 
of the three Communities remained separate until the entry into force on 1 July 1967 of the "Merger Treaty" 
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necessary for the transfer of powers to the new Court, the Convention included some 
substantial amendments which made the requirements concerning judges and advocates 
general more stringent. According to the ECSC Treaty the judges only had to be "persons of 
recognized independence and competence", which explains why the Dutch politician Petrus 
"Jos" Serrarens and the French economist Jacques Rueff were able to be nominated as judges 
at the Court although they did not have any legal training.21 However, the Convention 
stipulated that they were to be chosen among persons "whose independence is beyond doubt 
and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in 
their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence". This 
undoubtedly enhanced both the legal capacity and the credibility of the CJEC. 
 
2.2 The architecture starts to develop – towards a more elaborate 
court system  
 
2.2.1 The increasing workload of the CJEC 
 
For the first decades the workload of the CJEC stayed reasonable, and the story tells that the 
first preliminary reference was greeted with the popping of champagne.22 The case load grew 
relatively slowly, and during the 1950's and the 1960's the CJEC only rarely had to deal with 
more than 50 cases per year.23 However, after the first two decades the number of new cases 
turned to a sharp increase. There are various reasons for this trend, such as the general 
increase in the volume of new Community legislation, the first enlargement24, as well as the 
increased willingness of national courts to make preliminary references. Whereas in 1963 
there were 6 preliminary references, ten years later the corresponding figure had risen to 61.25   
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(signed in Brussels on 8 April 1965). According to the Merger Treaty the Commission of the EEC and 
the Council of the EEC replaced the Commission and Council of Euratom and the High Authority and Council 
of the ECSC.  
21 See De Waele (2015), pp. 24−25. 
22 Arnull (2006), p. 25. 
23 Brown and Kennedy (2000), Table 1 at Appendix II, p. 420.  
24 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973. 
25 Statistical information of the Court of Justice (1997), p. 19.  
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In 1973 the CJEC had to deal with a record number of 192 new cases in total, out of which as 
many as 100 were staff cases (the previous year there had been only 82 cases in total).26 As a 
consequence, the CJEC started for the first time to advocate for a second court to share its 
workload and, by doing this, planted the seeds for the development of the judiciary from a 
single court to a multi-layered court system. However, as the following sections will explain, 
it took one failed attempt and fifteen years of time before this became a reality. 
 
2.2.2 The first attempt to create an Administrative Tribunal 
 
The sudden and sharp increase in the number of staff cases lead the CJEC to act promptly.  In 
1974 the sitting and former Presidents of the CJEC, Lord Mackenzie Stuart and Robert 
Lecourt appeared in person before the Council and asked for the establishment of an 
administrative tribunal to deal with staff cases. The proposal was also presented in a letter of 
the CJEC of 22 July 1974.27  
 
However, the other institutions did not seem to be convinced of a pressing need to reform the 
court system, as it took four years before the Commission, following an invitation made by 
the Council, issued a proposal for a Regulation establishing an "Administrative Tribunal of 
the European Communities".28 At the time there was no explicit legal basis for the 
establishment of new tribunals in the Treaties, but the Commission based, as suggested by 
the CJEC itself29, its proposal on Article 179 of the EEC Treaty according to which "[t]he 
Court of Justice shall be competent to decide in any case between the Community and its 
employees, within the limits and under the conditions laid down by the relevant statute of 
                                                             
26 Statistical information of the Court of Justice (1997), p. 18  
27 Kennedy (1989), p. 9. 
28 Proposal for a Council Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) amending the staff regulations of officials and 
conditions of employment of other servants of the European Communities and establishing an administrative 
tribunal of the European Communities, COM/1978/395/CNS, OJ C 225, 22.9.1978, p. 6. See, Kraemer (2009), 
p. 1875. 
29 Kennedy (1989), p. 9. 
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service or conditions of employment." In concrete terms the establishment of the new 
tribunal was to be made by amending the Staff Regulations.  
 
In retrospect one can question whether it would have been legally feasible to establish a new 
tribunal based only on secondary legislation. However, this dilemma did not have to be 
solved because the new tribunal never saw daylight. Apparently, the reason for this was that 
agreement could not be reached on the question of whether this tribunal should be of a 
mainly judicial or of a mainly administrative character.30 Thus, the CJEC continued for 
another decade to deal with all cases at first and last instance.  
 
Even though this failure must have been a disappointment to the CJEC, it seems that finally 
the worst-case scenario did not materialize. After the exceptional year 1973 the number of 
staff cases dropped back to some 20-30 per year31 and in addition, at least a temporary relief 
for solving the workload of the CJEC was offered by the expansion of the CJEC by two new 
judges and two new advocates general following the first enlargement in 1973 (Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom). After this enlargement there was one judge from each 
Member State as well as four advocates general, one from each of the "large Member States" 
(France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom).32  
 
2.3 The birth of the Court of First Instance 
 
Even though the effort described above was the first official attempt to create a second layer 
to the Community judicature, the roots of the CFI properly speaking can be traced back to 
1978 when the CJEC issued a memorandum33 in which it drew the attention of the Council to 
certain measures it considered necessary to maintain the quality and effectiveness of its work. 
The CJEC referred to its increasing workload and pointed out that the future accessions of 
                                                             
30 Schermers (1988), pp. 542−543. 
31 Brown and Kennedy (2000), p. 420. 
32 Brown and Kennedy (2000), p. 71. 
33 "Mémorandum de la Cour sur les mesures qu'elle juge nécessaires aux fins de son fonctionnement actuel et 
futur", annexed to a letter of the President of the CJEC Hans Kutscher to the President of the Council Hans 
Dieter Genscher, of 21 July 1978.  
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Greece, Spain and Portugal as well as the entry into force of several Conventions attributing 
competences to the CJEC would aggravate the problem. The CJEC presented several 
proposals for measures aimed at alleviating the problem (such as adding the number of 
judges and advocates general and approving certain amendments to its Rules of Procedure). 
The CJEC also reiterated its request for the immediate establishment of a staff tribunal and 
suggested that also some other categories of cases brought by private persons, such as those 
related to competition, could be subject to similar arrangements.  
 
The CJEC recognised that this would necessitate a Treaty amendment, which could, 
according to the memorandum, be made in connection with the next accession. The 
advantages of such a structural reform were underlined, stating that it would bring the 
judicial system of the Communities closer to Member States and confer the CJEC the 
function of judge of law instead of judge of facts ("la fonction de juge de droit à l'exclusion 
de celle de juge de fait"). As with the abovementioned initiative of the CJEC of 1974, the 
other institutions did not rush into modifying the Court system. Only the proposals related to 
amending the Rules of Procedure were acted upon immediately, but the other proposals 
seemed to be ignored by the legislator.34  
 
However, the workload of the Court continued its sharp increase. Whereas in 1970 the 
number of new cases was 79, in 1980 it had more than tripled to 279.35 Although the capacity 
of the CJEC grew when enlargements brought more judges and advocates general36 and other 
personnel was reinforced, the effects of these measures were quickly absorbed by the flow of 
new cases brought by accessions, as well as, more indirectly, the added complexity caused by 
having to deal with yet more languages and more national legal cultures. The stock of 
pending cases kept growing and, subsequently, the time taken by the proceedings lengthened 
steadily. For instance, in case of preliminary rulings, whereas the average time taken by the 
                                                             
34 With the Greek accession in 1981 the number of judges was increased from 9 to 11 and the number of 
advocates general from 4 to 5, and in 1986 the acts of accession of Spain and Portugal raised the number of 
judges to 13 and that of advocates general to six. See Kennedy (1989), p. 12.  
35 Statistical information of the Court of Justice (1997), p. 18. 
36 The number of legal secretaries assisting the judges and the advocates general was raised from two to three in 
1986. Brown and Kennedy (2000), p. 71. 
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CJEC to hand down a ruling was six months in 1975, in 1984 it had more than doubled up to 
14 months.37 Many commentators were of the opinion that the maximum time for getting a 
preliminary ruling should be around 12 months, claiming that forcing the national courts to 
suspend their proceedings for a longer time was hard to reconcile with the obligations of 
Member States under the ECHR.38 
 
The constantly lengthening handling times worried not only the CJEC itself but also the 
commentators.39 According to Schermers, "to any observer it is clear that the work-load of 
the Court of Justice is too heavy".40 The CJEC was in particular concerned about the 
potential effect that this trend might have to national courts, rendering them reluctant to make 
preliminary references – the core element of judicial remedies in the Community and "the 
instrument of integration par excellence".41 This in turn would undermine the role of the 
CJEC and jeopardize the uniformity of Community law. On the other hand, the complex 
cases related to competition and anti-dumping required very detailed and time-consuming 
examination of facts, which was not possible because of the heavy workload and the stress 
related to keeping the handling times reasonable. The need for a structural solution became 
more and more pressing. 
 
2.3.1 The Single European Act and a legal basis for the establishment of a 
CFI 
 
Every student of European law knows by heart that the first major revision of the Treaties, 
the Single European Act42 (hereinafter: SEA) of 1986 provided for the completion of the 
internal market by the end of 1992. A less known fact is that the SEA also added to the 
                                                             
37 See e.g. Millet (1989), p. 833. 
38 See e.g. Millet (1989), p. 812, Van Gerven (1996), p. 219 and Dyrberg (2001), p. 293. 
39 Millet (1989), pp. 811−813. 
40 Schermers (1988), p. 542. 
41 Jacqué and Weiler (1990), p. 187.  
42 Signed in Luxemburg on 17 February 1986 (by the nine Member States) and in the Hague on 28 February 
1986 (Denmark, Italy and Greece), and came into force on 1st July 1987.    
12 
 
Treaties a legal basis that made it possible for the Council to establish the Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities (hereinafter: CFI).  
 
The SEA was prepared by the Inter-Governmental Conference (hereinafter: IGC) of 1985-
1986.43  The CJEC took the initiative once again and sent to the Council a letter explaining 
the difficult situation it was facing and, to make things as simple as possible, annexed draft 
proposals for Treaty provisions enabling the establishment of a CFI.44 According to the letter 
the number of preliminary references on the one hand, and those of complex cases related to 
competition, state aids, anti-dumping and steel production on the other, had grown rapidly, 
which had resulted to constantly lengthening handling times. The CJEC warned the Council 
that this might in the medium term affect seriously the effectiveness and the quality of the 
judicial control in the legal order of the Communities. To solve the problem, the CJEC 
proposed adding to the Treaties a legal basis allowing the establishment by the Council of a 
court with jurisdiction to hear cases involving examination of complex factual situations as 
well as cases of minor importance. This would, according to the letter, allow the CJEC to 
concentrate its efforts on its essential task of securing the respect of law in the application 
and interpretation of the Treaties.  
 
The draft articles proposed by the CJEC were not controversial. The only problem seemed to 
be related to the fact that IGC had been convened only to examine changes proposed to the 
EEC Treaty, whereas the legal basis proposed by the CJEC had to be added also in the 
Euratom Treaty and the ECSC Treaty. Nevertheless, the Luxembourg presidency managed to 
overcome this legal-institutional problem45 and hence, the final version of the SEA 
empowered the Council (unanimously at the request of the CJEC and after consulting the 
Commission and the European Parliament) to "attach to the Court of Justice a court with 
jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance, subject to a right of appeal to the Court of 
Justice on points of law only and in accordance with the conditions laid down by the Statute, 
                                                             
43 The IGC opened on 9 September 1985 and closed on 28 February 1986. 
44 Letter of 8 November 1985 from the President of the CJEC, Lord Mackenzie Stuart to President of the 
Council, Jacques F. Poos.  
45 See Kennedy (1989), p. 14. 
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certain classes of action or proceeding brought by natural or legal persons".46 It was 
expressly stipulated that the new court shall not be competent to hear and determine actions 
brought by Member States or by institutions or questions referred for preliminary ruling.  
 
2.3.2 The establishment of a Court of First Instance  
 
The SEA entered into force on 1st July 1987, and already in September of the same year the 
CJEC, determined to have the new court established as soon as possible, forwarded to the 
Council a formal request for the establishment of the CFI, along with drafts for the legal texts 
necessary and a memorandum concerning the budgetary implications.47 The CJEC motivated 
in its explanatory note the proposals by stating, first, that especially for cases involving 
examination of complex facts the establishment of a two degree jurisdiction will enhance the 
legal protection of individuals. Secondly the CJEC referred to its lengthening handling times 
and heavy workload, that is hard to reconcile with the requirements of a proper 
administration of justice and risks compromising the ever so important preliminary reference 
procedure. 
 
Even though it has been speculated that the Council at first did not seem particularly eager to 
create the new court48 the legislator handled the proposal promptly and the Decision 88/591 
establishing the CFI49 was published in the Official Journal in November 1988, only a little 
more than a year after the launching of the official proposal. However, in the course of the 
legislative process the original proposal went through some quite significant changes, the 
most important of which related to the composition and the jurisdiction of the CFI.  
 
                                                             
46 The new Article 32d of the ECSC Treaty, the new Article 168a of the EEC Treaty and the new Article 140a 
of the Euratom Treaty. 
47 Letter of 29 September 1987 from the President of the CJEC, Lord Mackenzie Stuart, to the President of the 
Council Uffe Ellemann-Jensen.  
48 Schermers (1988), p. 542. 
49 Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court of First Instance of 
the European Communities, OJ 1988 L 319, p. 1. 
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As to the composition, the CJEC had proposed a moderate seven-member court, sitting in 
two chambers of three judges. Nevertheless, the Council opted for a bigger court consisting 
of 12 members. This number, conveniently equal to the number of Member States at the 
time, had been suggested by both the European Parliament50 and the Commission.51 Also, the 
possibility to call upon one of the members to act as advocate general was mentioned.52 As to 
the institutional status of the new court, Article 1 of the Decision 88/591 stipulated that the 
CFI shall be "attached to" the CJEC and that its "seat shall be" at the CJEC. Thus, the CFI 
was clearly not independent but ancillary to the CJEC. The Commission had even suggested 
a system in which judges of the CJEC would have to be consulted with respect of the 
appointments proposed for the CFI by the Member States, obliged each time to propose twice 
as many candidates as there as posts to be filled.53 However, this proposal did not gain 
enough success. 
 
As regards jurisdiction, the legal basis stipulated in a general manner that the competence of 
the CFI could cover "certain classes of action or proceeding brought by natural or legal 
persons". The CJEC chose to suggest the transfer to the CFI of the competence on a few 
quite limited areas, namely actions brought by natural or legal persons concerning staff cases 
as well as competition and anti-dumping cases and coal and steel cases arising from the 
application of the ECSC Treaty. During the years 1953-1987 staff cases had represented 25,2 
% of all cases decided by the CJEC54, so in numeral terms their transfer represented a 
considerable relief for the CJEC, even if substance-wise they rarely were complicated. 
However, the legislator opted for an even narrower field of competence and dropped anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy cases outside the Decision 88/591, as suggested by the 
                                                             
50 Legislative resolution of the European Parliament, adopted at its sitting of 17 June 1988, OJ C187/223.  
51 Establishment of a Court of First Instance. Preliminary guidelines adopted by the Commission for the 
preparation of an opinion on the proposal put forward by the Court of Justice for a Council decision establishing 
a Court of First Instance (CFI) and amending the statutes of the Court of Justice, SEC(88)366 final, 18 May 
1988, p. 6 and the supplementary document, SEC(88)1121 final, 20 July 1988. 
52 The Commission suggested that the role of the advocate general should be institutionalized (preliminary 
guidelines of the Commission p. 5 and the supplementary comments, p. 4). 
53 Preliminary guidelines of the Commission, p. 6 and the supplementary document, p. 3. See also 
Vandersanden (1991), p. 54. 
54 Vandersanden (1991), p. 56. 
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Commission in its opinion55 as well as by France.56 They motivated their position by stating 
inter alia that the decision making procedure related to these matters was already too 
cumbersome to justify a double level of judicial control, that the jurisprudence concerning 
these questions was not sufficiently developed for them to be transferred to the new court and 
that the political and financial interests related to these cases is such that almost all 
judgements must be expected to be subject to appeal to the CJEC.57  
 
2.3.3 The new Court of First Instance in action 
 
In October 1989 the CFI started to function. The choice made by the legislator regarding 
field of competence of the CFI, narrowed down compared to the proposal, was widely 
regretted and received critique not only from the CJEC but also from commentators who 
described the transfer of jurisdiction to be of an "overly limited nature"58 and the limitations 
to be "[i]n the light of the objectives of the establishment of the Court of First Instance […] 
particularly regrettable".59 Hence, it was predicted that although the establishment of the CFI 
would admittedly have a positive impact on the CJEC’s workload, it will not be “an infant 
prodigy” solving all of its problems.60 However, leaving the question on the competence 
aside, one can say that the decision founding the CFI was received in a very positive spirit.  
 
Some acknowledged that in the beginning the CFI, considering that the number of judges 
was relatively large and yet the field of competence quite limited, was a bit overstaffed. 
Nevertheless, this was not necessarily seen as a disadvantage. Schermers was confident that 
workload of the CFI would soon grow to fit the number of judges and stated that "it is good 
for a growing child to buy clothing somewhat larger than absolutely necessary".61 In a similar 
vein, Kennedy thought that it was probably advantageous that the CFI would have a "period 
                                                             
55 Preliminary guidelines of the Commission, pp. 3−4 
56 Millet (1989), pp. 820−821 and Vandersanden (1991), p. 57. 
57 Preliminary guidelines of the Commission, pp. 3−4. See also Arnull (1994), p. 300. 
58 Vandersanden (1991), p. 58. 
59 Kennedy (1989), p. 23. 
60 Van Ginderachter (1989), p. 5. 
61 Schermers (1988), pp. 546−547. 
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during which to cut its judicial teeth, to develop its own procedures and to establish its own 
reputation".62 
 
In practice the CFI was for the first years of its existence very much a civil service tribunal, 
staff cases forming a clear majority of its case load.63 Both the quality of the judgments of the 
CFI and its success in improving judicial review of complex facts were generally 
acknowledged64, although according to some commentators it concentrated even a little bit 
too meticulously on the examination of facts.65  
 
The CFI quickly became a natural and intrinsic part of the judicature of the Communities, 
and it was praised inter alia of having narrowed the gap between the Community and its 
citizens.66 The improvement of legal protection it brought to natural and legal persons 
followed on the one hand from the fact that the CFI was able to examine more thoroughly 
than the CJEC the facts of the case, and on the other from the existence of two levels of 
jurisdiction.  
                                                             
62 Kennedy (1989), p. 29. 
63 Kraemer (2009), p. 1876 and Kanninen (2006), p. 293. For instance, in 1991 out of 95 new cases 81 were 
staff cases. See Arnull (1994), p. 301.  
64 See e.g. Arnull (2006), pp. 138−139 and Brown and Kennedy (1994), p. 374. 
65 Van der Woude (1992), pp. 468−469. 
66 Speech of Jean-Luc Dehaene in the seminar "From 20 to 2020 – Building the CFI of tomorrow on solid 
foundations". 
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3 The court system becomes three-tier  
 
3.1 The situation after the creation of the CFI 
 
In his letter of 1991 the President of CJEC Due, acknowledging the quality of work done by 
the CFI, stated that it had "fait ses preuves en tant que jurisdiction dans l'ordre juridique 
communautaire"67 asked the Council to extend its jurisdiction. The initiative of the CJEC 
was acted upon and by Council Decisions made in 1993 and 1994 the jurisdiction of the CFI 
was extended to hearing and determining not only cases concerning anti-dumping and 
subsidies but virtually all actions brought by natural or legal persons.68 The current President 
of the GC, Marc Jaeger, has stated that the day of the adoption of the Decision of 1993 
should be regarded as a "red-letter day" in EU judicial history, because on this day the CFI 
became the sole and unique interlocutor for individuals and the business world and thus, a 
“general court” instead of a special one.69 This was a very welcome development for many 
reasons, not least because experience had shown that the initial field of competence of the 
CFI had been not only narrow but also unclear and apt to cause problems of interpretation.70 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht71, 1993 was also the year when the 
Treaty Article concerning the CFI was amended from a mere legal basis to a genuine 
institutional provision fixing the constitutional status of the CFI as part of the judicial 
architecture.72  
                                                             
67The Letter of the President of the CJEC Ole Due to the President of the Council Hans van den Broek, of 17 
October 1991, to which was attached a draft proposal (Projet de Décision du Conseil modifiant la Décision du 
Conseil du 24 Octobre 1988, instituant un Tribunal de Première Instance des Communautés Européennes). 
68 Council Decision 93/350/Euratom, ECSC, EEC of 8 June 1993 amending Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, 
EEC, Euratom establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities, OJ 1993 L 144, p. 21. On 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases, Council Decision 94/149/ECSC, EC, of 7 March 1994 amending Decision 
93/350/Euratom, ECSC, EEC amending Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom establishing a Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities, OJ 1994 L 66, p. 29. 
69 Jaeger (2017), p. 8. 
70 See Van der Woude (1992), p. 414. 
71 The Treaty of Maastricht was signed on 7 February 1992 and it entered into force on 1 November 1993. 
72 Article 32d of the ECSC Treaty, Article 168a of the EEC Treaty and Article 140a of the Euratom Treaty. The 
Maastricht Treaty also made it possible to expand the competences of the CFI by permitting the transfer under 
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Nevertheless, statistics showed clearly that the establishment of the CFI had not had the 
desired effect of liberating the resources of the CJEC for it to concentrate on its core tasks.73 
The total number of new cases coming to the CJEC kept growing almost at the same rate as 
before the establishment of the CFI, and even if there was for a short moment a temporary 
relief offered by the transfer of a bloc of pending cases to the CFI, it was quickly 
compensated by the rise in the number of both preliminary references and appeals from the 
judgments of the CFI. There were various reasons for this trend, such as inter alia the 
increased awareness of lawyers and the public of Community law, the intensified 
harmonisation related to the completion of the single market following the SEA and the 
expansion of areas over which the CJEC has competence, as well as the accessions of Spain 
and Portugal in 1986. Naturally also the new languages added the burden of translation 
services and thus added to the lengthening of handling times.  
 
3.2 The claims for a further reform start to rise 
 
In the course of the 1990's it became clear that the excessive length of proceedings was a 
fact74 and the claims for a further reform started to increase. Little by little also the quality of 
the judgments of the CJEC started to be criticised. The CJEC was accused inter alia of 
insufficient examination of facts and of "lack of mature reflection"75 as well as of 
overlooking the practical implications of its judgments and of "extreme laconicism".76 
According to a test introduced by Arnull in an article published in 1994 an efficient court is 
one which "within a reasonable period of time, gives just and intellectually compelling 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
its jurisdiction of all direct actions (instead of only those brought by natural and legal persons). However, this 
transfer of competences would have required a change of the Statute, which was made only much later, on the 
basis of the Nice Treaty. 
73 Of course, the work load situation would have been much worse without the establishment of the CFI. See, 
Vesterdorf (1992), pp. 904−905. 
74 See e.g. Brown and Kennedy (1994), p. 361, Voss (1993), p. 1119 and "The role and future of the European 
Court of Justice”, A report by Members of the EC Section of the British Institute's Advisory Board, p. 1.  
75 See e.g. Jacqué and Weiler (1990), pp. 188−189 and Arnull (1994), pp. 297−298.  
76 "The role and future of the European Court of Justice”, A report by Members of the EC Section of the British 
Institute's Advisory Board, p. 95. 
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decisions".77 Both the writer himself and other commentators doubted whether the judiciary 
of the Communities still passed this test this and would be able to pass it in the future.78 
 
Different ideas on how to maintain the effectiveness and the quality of the Community 
judicature kept flowing. The suggestions covered a wide range of potential solutions, 
stretching from different modifications in the respective areas of competence of the two 
courts79 and adding the number of judges in one or both of the courts80 to more radical 
upheavals of the judicial architecture. Jacqué and Weiler proposed in their famous article 
published as early as in 1990 a judiciary consisting of a European High Court of Justice and 
four Regional Courts.81 Van Gerven, on the other hand, suggested transforming the CFI into 
a court of general jurisdiction and creating alongside it several specialised first instance 
courts, located somewhere else than Luxembourg.82 The creation of a Staff Tribunal with 
appeals on points of law to the CFI or alternatively increasing the size of the CFI were also 
brought up.83   
  
 
3.3 The Treaty of Amsterdam – the missed opportunity 
 
With the IGC leading eventually to the Treaty of Amsterdam84 approaching in 1996 there 
seemed to be a perfect momentum for Treaty changes. Nevertheless, the questions relating to 
the architecture of the judicature never ended up on its agenda. The obvious reason for this 
                                                             
77 Arnull (1994), p. 297. 
78 See also Scorey (1996), p. 224.  
79 Arnull proposed the transfer to the CFI of certain actions brought by Member States [Arnull (1994), 304-307] 
and Voss was of the view that the interpretation of directives and regulations was not a task to be loaded of the 
CJEC but should be transferred to the CFI [Voss (1993), p. 1126]. 
80 Voss (1993), p. 1199 and p. 1126.  
81 See Jacqué and Weiler (1990).  
82 Van Gerven (1996), p. 218. Similarily, see Brown and Kennedy who in their book brought up the idea of 
creating more first instance courts, each with their specific area of jurisdiction such as a customs court and a 
social security court. See Brown and Kennedy (1994), p. 366. 
83 "The role and future of the European Court of Justice”, A report by Members of the EC Section of the British 
Institute's Advisory Board, 30-39 ("study of measures adopted so far to improve the efficiency of the Court of 
Justice"). 
84 Signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999. 
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was that despite the worries expressed and suggestions presented by helpful commentators, 
the courts themselves did not see the necessity for structural changes at that point, although 
the workload kept rising and the courts of the latest additions, Austria, Finland and Sweden 
(in 1995), generated more preliminary references than expected.85 They preferred to wait 
until both Community courts were settled with their respective areas of competence after the 
transfers of jurisdiction of 1993 and 1994 from the CFI to the CJEC and to make some 
adjustments to their working methods before considering any radical changes to the structure 
of the judiciary. This position comes clear from their reports of May 1995 to the Study Group 
preparing the work of the IGC of 1996.86   
 
In its report the CJEC stated that the creation of the CFI has indeed "afforded great protection 
to individuals and enabled the CJEC to devote itself more fully to its essential task of 
ensuring the uniform application of the law, under conditions which preserve the quality and 
efficiency of the judicial system". The CJEC admitted being aware of the need to reduce the 
time taken to deal with preliminary references, which it described as the "veritable 
cornerstone of the internal market" and stressed the importance of this system remaining 
open for all national courts.87 The CJEC was confident that the recent transfer to the CFI of 
jurisdiction in all direct actions brought by individuals should allow it to cut down the 
handling times. Nevertheless, the CJEC indicated its willingness to examine solutions such as 
the chambers of the CFI becoming specialised or the new specialised Community courts 
being established, if this proved necessary in the future.  
 
The CFI gave its own, independent report to the Study Group. The report expressed the 
concern of the CFI over the risks of its workload increasing heavily in the coming years and 
referred to the absolute necessity of adding the number of judges as well as the benefits of 
                                                             
85 See Craig (2001), pp. 183−184, Voss (1993), p. 1119 and Naômé (2008), pp. 102−103. 
86 "Report of the Court of Justice on certain aspects of the application of the treaty on European Union" and 
"Contribution by the Court of First Instance to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference", both Luxembourg, 
May 1995.  
87 Thus, the CJEC implicitly rejected the idea of limiting the right to make references to higher national courts. 
See Arnull (1995), p. 604. 
21 
 
setting up specialised chambers (not requiring Treaty changes).88 Nevertheless, the CFI did 
not find it necessary to amend the structure of the judicature at this point.89 
 
As a result, the Amsterdam Treaty was even less interesting from the point of view of the 
structure of the judicial apparatus of the European Union than the Treaty of Maastricht a few 
years earlier. Even the name of the judiciary remained "Court of Justice of the European 
Communities", despite the creation of the European Union.90 
 
3.4 Time for big reforms – The Treaty of Nice 
 
In 1999 the average length of giving a preliminary ruling had lengthened to 21,2 months91 
and the risk of national courts turning their backs on the system seemed more and more 
realistic. The President of the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, Pekka Hallberg 
stated in a conference held in Helsinki in 1999 that one of the main reasons behind the 
relative passivity of his court in the field of preliminary references was the fact that it simply 
takes too long to get a ruling.92 Also Torkel Gregow from the Supreme Court of Sweden 
referred to similar problems.93 On a similar vein, in the same conference Sir Nicholas 
Forwood QC who represented the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (hereinafter: 
CCBE) and spoke from the point of view of practitioners confirmed that the delay in getting 
a preliminary ruling affects the advice that a lawyer gives to his client on whether to raise a 
Community law point as part of his defence or not.94 
 
The situation was made especially alarming by the fact that the next, by far the biggest 
enlargement in the history of the union was on its way. The enlargement would naturally add 
the number of incoming cases, but also gravely aggravate the problems related to translation, 
                                                             
88 The report of the CFI, p. 5-7. 
89 The report of the CFI, p. 4-5. 
90 The name was only changed by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
91 Statistics of judicial activity of the Court of Justice 1999.  
92 In Sundström and Kauppi (1998), p. 112. 
93 Ibid., p. 253. 
94 Ibid.¸p. 189. 
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which had already become a serious bottleneck and thus, one of the most important reasons 
behind the excessive handling times.95 
 
What were the reasons behind the ever-growing workload? In addition to the usual 
explanations related to the enlargements and the expansion of the scope and quantity of 
legislation96 there were also other, more complex ones. GC Judge Meij was of the view that 
the lengthening handling times were not attributable only to a bigger number of new cases 
but also to the fact that cultural differences, translation and interpretation as well the research 
of cases representing fifteen different legal backgrounds seriously restricted the production 
capacity of both courts.97 On a more political and sociological note Arnull submitted that 
behind the increasing case load lay also the loss of the original homogeneity of Member 
States and the fact that the people of Europe had become more critical towards the political 
and legal institutions and thus, more litigious.98 According to Rasmussen, on the other hand, 
one of the reasons behind the popularity of the CJEC was its activism; as long as the CJEC 
would continue its "law-making and policy-making activities", parties before national courts 
would consider it worthwhile trying persuade it to making some new law which will benefit 
their cause. He also blamed the CILFIT judgment99 for rendering the preliminary reference 
procedure a magnet for unnecessary cases and stated that the one judge per Member State 
principle risked turning the plenary into a deliberating assembly and thus, was harmful to the 
efficiency of the CJEC.100 Something had to be done, or else the preliminary reference 
procedure and, subsequently, the unity and consistency of community law were at risk.101  
 
As regards the CFI, its workload problems were related in particular to the arrival of the first 
wave of appeals brought against decisions of the Boards of Appeal of the Office for 
                                                             
95 See e.g. Brown and Kennedy (2000), p. 385 and Rasmussen (2000), p. 1095.  
96 Geelhoed (2005), p. 400.  
97 Meij (2000), p. 1040. This is also why, according to Meij, Community courts cannot be compared to national 
courts when assessing the workload.  
98 Arnull (1999), pp. 516−517. 
99 Case 283/81, CILFIT. 
100 Rasmussen (2000), p. 1082. 
101 See e.g. Rasmussen in the Hanasaari conference, Sundström and Kauppi (1998), p. 140.  
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Harmonisation in the Internal Market concerning trademarks and designs.102 As it was 
expected that the number of these appeals would grow in the future, the courts submitted to 
the Council a proposal for adding to the composition of the GC six extra judges.103 However, 
even though in principle this proposal was supported, it did not fly as the Member States 
were not able to decide how to distribute the posts of extra judges among themselves.104 As 
will be explained later in section 4, this was indicative to the problems that the reform 
proposal of 2011 would face.  
 
3.4.1 The Intergovernmental Conference of 2000 
 
The IGC of 2000 (eventually leading to the Nice Treaty) presented a perfect opportunity for 
modifying the architecture of the CJEC, the whole purpose of this project being to reform the 
institutional structure of the EU to endure the next big enlargement (also bearing in mind that 
the making of any Treaty changes would be far more difficult with eight, ten or more new 
Member States).  
 
This time also the courts themselves were convinced of the need to find a solution of an 
institutional nature to tackle the problems. Time had shown that the additional transfers of 
jurisdiction from the CJEC to the CFI in 1993−1994 and the internal measures aimed at 
making the working methods of the two courts more effective were not sufficient to allow the 
courts to deal in a satisfactory way with their ever-increasing workloads. Thus, the two courts 
(together this time) issued a reflection paper that was presented to the Ministers of Justice in 
May 1999.105 The paper begun by alerting the Council to a dangerous trend towards a 
                                                             
102 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark, OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1. 
See also the Annual Report of 1999, Proceedings of the Court of First Instance, p. 2.  
103 Proposals submitted by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance with regard to the new intellectual 
property cases – Note on the effect of intellectual property cases on the budgetary requests for the year 2000. 
Doc. 8198/99, 10.5.1999.    
104 See, the answer of President of the CFI, Bo Vesterdorf, to the question (Q389) addressed to him in the House 
of Lords European Union Committee (An EU Competition Court: report with evidence, 15th report of session 
2006-07). 
105 L'avenir du système juridictionnel de l'Union européenne - Document de réflexion de la Cour de justice et du 
Tribunal de première instance, Council doc. 8208/99 of 11 May 1999.  
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structural imbalance between the volume of incoming cases and the capacity of the system.106 
As a quick cure the report identified a series of concrete measures that would be executable 
by simple modifications of their Rules of Procedure, the Statute or the Treaties. Nevertheless, 
the courts underlined that finding a sustainable solution for the problems required thorough 
examination of the role and the structure of the community judiciary. In this vein, they 
presented general considerations concerning the future of the judiciary. The report mentioned 
as possible elements changes in the composition of the court (inter alia raising the number of 
judges in the CFI), further transfers of competences from the CJEC to the CFI and different 
modifications of the preliminary reference procedure. When the IGC started, the CJEC and 
the CFI also repeated the same proposals in an official contribution, along with proposals for 
concrete Treaty amendments.107  
 
The Commission wanted to take part of this project and gave the task of brainstorming ideas 
to the "Working Party on the Future of the European Court of Justice"; a group of seven 
"wise men" presided by (then former) President Due. The mission of this group was to 
"review the various possible courses which may be taken in order to maintain the quality and 
consistency of case law in the years to come, bearing in mind the number and present 
duration of proceedings and foreseeable developments, in particular in light of new 
jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by the Amsterdam Treaty and the forthcoming 
enlargement."108  
 
This Working Party produced a report109 (generally known as "the Due report") that drew 
attention to three phenomena that evidenced "a serious crisis in the current court system of 
the Communities"; 1) the steady rise in the number of cases brought before the two 
Community courts, 2) the inadequate number of cases terminated in relation to the number of 
                                                             
106 According to the report the situation was already alarming especially as regards preliminary references, and 
the entry into force of the third phase of the EMU, the Treaty of Amsterdam and certain conventions in the area 
of the third pillar as well as the incoming enlargement risked causing a considerable rise of the number of new 
cases (pp. 7−8). 
107 CIG 2000: Contribution de la Cour de Justice et du Tribunal de première Instance à la Conférence 
intergouvernementale, CONFER/VAR 3964/00, 28.2.2000.  
108 The Due report, p. 1. 
109 Report by the Working Party on the future of the European Communities’ court system. January 2000.  
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new cases brought, and 3) the lengthening of the time taken by proceedings. Considering 
these trends, the Report included several long-term proposals intended to show what the 
court system could be like in fifteen years. The most interesting proposals from the point of 
view of the architecture of the judicature concerned the creation of specialist tribunals. The 
Working Party proposed that an "interinstitutional complaints tribunal" be set up 
immediately to deal with staff cases as a judicial body of first instance.110  
 
However, despite this extensive groundwork it was uncertain whether the CJEC would end 
up in the agenda of the IGC at all. And when it finally did, it seemed that the proposals 
concerning the judicature did not get the attention they deserved and risked falling into 
oblivion, all the attention being focused on the reforms of the political institutions (such as 
the weighing of votes in the Council and the size and the composition of the Commission in 
the enlarged union).111 This worried the CJEC up the point of the President Rodriguez 
Iglesias publishing in the French newspaper Le Monde an article pleading for attention to the 
indispensable reforms of the CJEC identified in its contribution to the IGC.112  
 
In passing, it can be noted that not everyone was convinced that the proposals made by the 
courts and the Due group in their reports went to the right direction. Rasmussen stated in his 
critical article in 2000113 that the reform should concentrate on the preliminary reference 
procedure which was at the core of the problem. He made several alternative proposals aimed 
at either limiting the number of references or dividing the workload caused by them between 
the two courts. He strongly accused both the courts and the Due Working Party for being too 
modest and prudent in their proposals and for burying their heads in the sand.114  
 
 
                                                             
110 The Due report, pp. 30−31.  
111 Meij (2000), p. 1039 and Johnston (2001), p. 500. 
112 Rodriguez Iglesias (2000b). He also published an article resuming the proposals made by the two courts in 
their contribution. Rodriguez Iglesias (2000a). 
113 Rasmussen (2000), pp. 1071–1112. 
114 Rasmussen (2000). 
26 
 
3.4.2 The Nice Treaty 
 
Despite the fears of the CJEC the judicial system was not forgotten and the Nice Treaty115 
did introduce many significant changes to the provisions concerning the CJEC. The 
formulation of the relevant Treaty provisions was prepared by a special "Friends of the 
Presidency" group consisting of legal experts from the Member States and the EU 
institutions.116 The new provisions provided for several possibilities to alleviate the workload 
situation in both courts. The common feature of the amendments made in the Treaties by the 
Nice Treaty was their flexibility. Rather than reforming the system the authors of the Nice 
Treaty built the basis for future changes by making to the Treaties amendments which 
opened the possibility for the legislator to make the changes in deemed necessary, according 
to its own judgement.  
 
First, the Nice Treaty introduced a legal basis for the creation of the so called judicial panels 
(later, special tribunals), "to hear and determine at first instance certain classes of action or 
proceeding brought in specific areas" (Article 225bis). In declaration No 16 annexed to the 
Nice Treaty the Conference asked the CJEC and the Commission to swiftly draft a decision 
establishing a judicial panel which has jurisdiction to deliver judgments at first instance on 
staff disputes.117  
 
Secondly, the Treaty provided for the possibility to raise the number of judges in the CFI 
superior to the number of Member States.118 As to the CJEC, the one judge per Member State 
principle was finally expressly codified to the Treaties.119  
                                                             
115 The Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 and came into force on 1 February 2003. 
116 Johnston (2001), pp. 500−501. 
117 First of the possible fields identified in the Due report for special treatment was staff cases (the Due report, 
p. 30). Intellectual property cases, judicial cooperation in civil matters, Title VI of the Union Treaty on 
cooperation in the fields of police and home affairs and Title IV on visas, asylum and immigration, as well as 
competition cases were also listed as possible areas. 
118 According to the first paragraph of the new Article 224, "[t]he Court of First Instance shall comprise at least 
one judge per Member State. The number of judges shall be determined by the Statute of the Court of Justice".  
119 The CJEC had not presented strong views on the number of judges, considering it to be a political question. 
Nevertheless, President Rodriguez Iglesias had pointed out that a significant augmentation of the number of 
judges of the CJEC risked transforming the plenary from a judicial collegiate body into a deliberative assembly. 
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Thirdly, the new provisions erased the rule according to which the GC could only handle 
actions raised by (private and legal) persons and broadened the potential scope of 
competence of the GC in a remarkable manner. Before the Treaty of Nice the division of 
competences between the two courts could be resumed so that the CFI was responsible for 
administrative cases, brought by individuals against acts that concerned them directly and 
individually, whereas the CJEC acted as an appeals court as well as the constitutional court 
responsible for cases brought by Member States and institutions, having in principle general 
and abstract implications.120 By the Nice Treaty this logic was abolished and the rule 
concerning the division of competence between the two courts was reversed so that in almost 
all direct actions the main rule was the jurisdiction of the CFI. 
 
Thus, after little bit less than 25 years of existence the CFI had transformed from a special 
court working on a few narrowly defined areas of competence to an integral, independent and 
important part of the judicature of the Communities, with a clear and distinctive role; "le juge 
de droit commun".121 Only infringement cases, cases assigned to a judicial panel and those 
reserved in the Statute for the CJEC122 were left outside its competence.123 As to the 
preliminary references, according to the new Article 225(3) the CFI "shall have jurisdiction 
to hear and to determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 234, in 
specific areas laid down by the Statute".  
 
In addition, the symbolic status of the CFI and its independence from the CJEC were further 
enhanced.124 Whereas previously the CFI was only "attached to the Court of Justice", 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
On the other hand, he referred to the advantages of having all national systems represented. See Rodriguez 
Iglesias (2000a), p. 3. 
120 Iannone (2005), p. 162.  
121 Iannone (2005), p. 169.  
122 In Article 51 of the Statute annexed to the Treaty of Nice actions brought by Member States, by the 
institutions and by the Central Bank were reserved for the CJEC. 
123 The new Article 225(1) first subparagraph provided that "‘The Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction 
to hear and determine at first instance actions or proceedings referred to in Articles 230, 232, 235, 236 and 238, 
with the exception of those assigned to a judicial panel and those reserved in the Statute for the Court of Justice. 
The Statute may provide for the Court of First Instance to have jurisdiction for other classes of action or 
proceeding". 
124 Johnston (2001), p. 503.  
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according to the new wording of Article 220 the "Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance, each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of 
this Treaty the law is observed" which clearly elevated the institutional status of the CFI. 
This was confirmed by the provision of specific articles concerning its composition and 
jurisdiction and by the possibility to attach to it judicial panels.  
 
However, the results of the Nice Treaty concerning the CJEC were largely criticised for not 
being sufficiently ambitious in tackling the courts' problems in a systematic and sustainable 
way. In addition to the critique presented by Rasmussen, referred to above, Dyrberg stated 
that the Nice Treaty only contains a "modest beginning of a process" and pleaded for an 
extensive reform.125 Johnston stated that "a serious reform of the very system itself is 
necessary, if the Union's desire to become a first-rate world economy is to be matched by a 
first-rate administration of justice"126 and Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer regretted 
the lack of will to find a global and systematic solution to the problems of the judiciary.127 
Wouters, on a more general level, criticized the Nice Treaty for not enhancing the legitimacy 
of the CJEC for instance by making the nomination system of members more democratic and 
by introducing separate and dissenting opinions at the CJEC, which would add openness and 
accountability.128 On the other hand, many acknowledged that despite these shortcomings 
many significant changes were indeed adopted.129 In retrospect it has even been said that 
these changes constituted a first step in the development from a Community jurisdiction 
towards a Community judicial system130 and that they marked a revolution in the relation 
between the CJEC and the CFI.131  
 
 
                                                             
125 Dyrberg (2001), pp. 292−294. 
126 Johnston (2001), p. 499. 
127 Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer (2001), pp. 705−706. 
128 Wouters (2001), pp. 345−347. 
129 See e.g. Johnston (2001), p. 522, Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer (2001), p. 705 and p. 722 and Khan (2002), p. 12. 
130 Geelhoed (2005), pp. 399−402.  
131 Iannone (2005), p. 161. 
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3.5 The establishment of the Civil Service Tribunal 
 
The Nice Treaty entered into force on 1 February 2003 and already before the end of the year 
the Commission presented its proposal for establishing a CST.132 The proposal was, 
according to its explanatory part, one component of the reform of the court system provided 
for by the Treaty of Nice to "remedy the growing hold-ups in the Community courts".133 The 
proposal included the creation of a small tribunal consisting of six judges. From an 
institutional point of view the real novelty of the proposal was the creation of a committee 
tasked to give an opinion on the candidates' suitability to perform the duties of judge.134 
According to the proposal the committee, consisting of seven members, would give an 
opinion on candidates' suitability before the nomination of judges by the Council and to draw 
up a list of the candidates having the "most suitable high-level experience". The actual 
decision establishing the CST would only contain the necessary institutional provisions, 
whereas the articles related to the functioning of the CST would be in an annex of the Statute 
of the Court of Justice, the underlying idea being that other annexes could easily be added in 
case of establishment of further special tribunals – which at the time seemed to be the general 
assumption.135  
 
The handling of the proposal in the Council was relatively swift and uncontroversial, and 
most parts of the proposal were accepted almost as such (although the number of judges was 
raised from the proposed six to seven and some other minor adaptations were made). 
Nevertheless, the parts relating to the nomination of judges were subject to long discussions 
in the Council. This was hardly surprising, taking into account that for the first time the "one 
judge per Member State" principle was to be set aside and the prerogative of Member States 
to choose their national candidates would be abolished. After careful consideration the 
                                                             
132 Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a European Civil Service Tribunal, COM(2003) 705 final, 
19.11.2003. 
133 Paragraph 5.1.1 of the proposal. 
134 This part of the proposal was inspired by the draft Constitution (at the time still on the table) that in its 
Articles III-260 to III-262 provided for such a committee to be established in order to give an opinion before the 
nomination of judges and advocates general. 
135 See e.g. Dehousse (2011), p. 30 and Advocate General Jacobs, in the report "The Workload of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union", House of Lords: European Union Committee, Justice and institutions sub-
committee, "Oral evidence with associated written evidence", p. 60. 
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Council opted for a system based on an open call for applications in which any union citizen 
who fulfils the conditions could apply, and the committee was tasked to screen the 
applications.136 Thus, the system of selecting judges adopted could be characterised "merit-
based", as opposed to "Member-State -based".137 However, the Council was obligated, when 
appointing judges on the proposal of the committee, to ensure a balanced composition of the 
Civil Service Tribunal on as broad a geographical basis and as broad a representation of the 
national legal systems as possible.  
 
The Council Decision establishing the CST138 was adopted in November 2004, but it took 
one year before the President of the CJEC officially could declare that the CST had been 
constituted. Meanwhile, a call for applications to nominate the first judges was launched and 
the committee, presided by the former CJEC Judge Sevón, had completed its first ever task. 
Out of 243 applications139 the committee compiled a list of 14 persons, ranked in order of 
preference (even though the latter was not foreseen by the Decision, which only requires the 
list to contain at least twice as many candidates as there are judges to be appointed).140 The 
Council obediently nominated the first seven persons on the list to be the first judges of the 
CST141 and in December 2005 the competence to exercise at first instance jurisdiction in staff 
cases was officially transferred to the CST.142 
 
 
                                                             
136 According to fourth paragraph of Article 225a "[t]he members of the judicial panels shall be chosen from 
persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to judicial 
office." 
137 In a merit-based system some kind of a nomination committee can be considered a conditio sine qua non 
since, as one can imagine, without any prior filtering by an outside body the Council would have been driven to 
endless discussions and disputes over the candidates. 
138 Council Decision of 2 November 2004 establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, 
2004/752/EC, Euratom, OJ 2004 L 333, p. 7. 
139 De Waele (2015), p. 47. 
140 De Waele (2015), p. 40 and p. 47. 
141 Council Decision of 22 July 2005 appointing Judges of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, 
2005/577/EC, Euratom, OJ 2005 L 197, p. 28 
142 Decision of the President of the Court of Justice recording that the European Union Civil Service Tribunal 
has been constituted in accordance with law, OJ 2005 L 325, p. 1. 
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3.6 The Treaty of Lisbon  
 
The unfortunate Constitution, killed by the French and Dutch referenda in May and June 
2005, was officially buried after a "period of reflection" in the June 2007 European Council 
meeting. In the same meeting it was decided to convene a new IGC with a task to draw up a 
"Reform Treaty" amending the existing Treaties "with a view to enhancing the efficiency and 
the democratic legitimacy of the enlarged Union, as well as the coherence of its external 
action".143 The result was the Lisbon Treaty144 that brought significant changes to the system 
of judicial protection but did not add very much to the architecture of the judicature as such.  
 
From an institutional point of view the most interesting novelty was the creation, by Article 
255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union145 (hereinafter: TFEU), of a 
panel (hereinafter: Article 255 Panel) tasked to give an opinion on candidates' suitability to 
perform the duties of judge or advocate general before the governments of the Member States 
make the appointments. The Article 255 Panel was a replica of the committee already in use 
in the CST. Nevertheless, the nature of the task of the new Article 255 Panel was much more 
delicate, as it would scrutinize candidates proposed by Member States' governments, whereas 
the CST panel handled individual applications from persons applying in their personal 
capacity. This provision, which can be seen as a direct answer to the demands of making the 
nomination procedures less political and more democratic and transparent146, fitted well with 
the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty in enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the court members.   
 
There were also visible changes relating to the names of the court. For the first time the 
institution as such got a name, different from that of the higher court ("The Court of Justice 
of the European Union"). This was certainly a welcome revision, as it made it possible to 
                                                             
143 Preamble of the Lisbon Treaty. 
144 Signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon, the Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
145 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
146 According to Dyrberg, for instance, "[t]he qualifications required by Article 223 EC (independence beyond 
doubt, eligibility for the highest judicial offices in the country concerned or to be a jurisconsult of recognised 
competence) are, to say the least, not always fulfilled in practice". He, however, proposed involving the 
European Parliament in the procedure. See Dyrberg (2001), pp. 345−346. See also Wouters (2001), pp. 
345−347 and Barents (2010), p. 712. 
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distinguish references to the higher court as an individual court and references to the 
judiciary as an institution. Nevertheless, this amendment did not have any concrete 
repercussions as the institution CJEU was not endowed with any administrative or other 
competences or structures of its own and the president of the CJ would act also as the 
president of the whole institution. The names of the individual courts, apart from that of the 
CST, were also amended. The CJEC became "the Court of Justice" (hereinafter: CJ) and the 
CFI “the General Court".  
 
 
4 The saga of the latest reform 
 
This part presents the latest reform of the EU's court system, still partly unfinished. The 
reform consists of doubling the number of judges of the GC and of abolishing the CST. It is 
the result of a difficult compromise in an impasse and clearly the most controversial reform 
in the history of the CJEU. The reform was also marked by the fact that for the first time the 
European Parliament was involved in the procedure of amending the Statute of the CJEU, 
following an amendment brought by the Lisbon Treaty that changed the decision-making 
procedure in amending the Statute to the ordinary legislative procedure.  
 
4.1 The background of the reform 
 
As was explained in earlier, in section 3, the purpose of the establishment of the CST was to 
alleviate the workload of the other courts and especially that of the GC.147 Nevertheless, no-
one seemed to think this measure would solely constitute a magical cure solving the 
problems of the CJEU related to its growing number of cases. For instance Advocate General 
Geelhoed predicted as early as in 2005 that the growth in the demand for legal protection 
(caused by inter alia enlargements), changes in the scope of the union's powers and increased 
                                                             
147 See Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a European Civil Service Tribunal, COM(2003) 705 final, 
19.11.2003, paragraph 5.1.1. 
33 
 
legislative activity would lead to the demands on the EU courts growing significantly in five 
to ten years' time, which should be responded to by structural changes.148 Also others such as 
Barents voiced their worries over the capacity of the CJEU to handle the increasing workload 
in the near future.149   
 
These predictions proved to be correct in some respect, but the situation was not as 
straightforward as that. At the end of the first decade of the new century all three courts were 
in a very different situation as regards their respective workloads. As will be explained in the 
following, in summary the CST was doing well, the CJ was doing ok and the GC was in 
trouble. The reason for this divergence was first and foremost in the different nature of their 
tasks and competences. The CST, as a special court, had a more stable field of competence 
that was not likely to be enlarged by outside factors such as Treaty changes or waves of new 
legislation like that of the two other courts. It is also important to stress that the statistics 
showing the numbers of cases and their handling in the respective courts are necessarily not 
comparable. The role of the GC covers factual matters the examination of which can often be 
extremely laborious, especially in competition cases.150 On the other hand, even though the 
CJ often deals with cumbersome and politically difficult cases, its competence also covers 
cases that are not very laborious (such as infringement cases regarding failures to implement 
directives and simple preliminary references). Hence, even though in the following the 
situations of the three courts are examined in light of statistical information, these figures 
should not be compared to each other but assessed separately.  
 
4.1.1 The situation of the Civil Service Tribunal 
 
In the CST in 2010 the number of new cases was 113 and that of completed cases 155, and 
the average duration of proceedings was a fairly reasonable 18.1 months.151 Although the 
                                                             
148 Geelhoed (2005), pp. 407−408. He gave his preference to re-organising the judiciary according to a model 
consisting of a central Court and territorially decentralised specialist Union courts. 
149 Barents (2010), p. 728. 
150 See e.g. Dehousse (2011), pp. 16−17 and the report "The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union" of the House of Lords' European Union Committee, paragraph 45. 
151 Annual Report of the CJEU 2010, p. 226. 
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President of the CST, Paul Mahoney stated in the Annual Report 2010 that the number of 
new cases was significantly higher, the number of cases closed lower and the duration of 
proceedings longer than the previous year, all in all the CST seemed to be coping very well 
with its workload.152 
 
4.1.2 The situation of the Court of Justice 
 
Although the CJ had had problems with its workload, it managed to surprise the legal 
community in a positive way by being able not only to cope but even to improve its 
performance. As a result of a series of internal measures aimed at making its work more 
effective after the enlargement and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty it managed to cut 
down its stock of cases so that whereas in the end of 2003 there were 974 pending cases, in 
the end of 2010 the corresponding figure was 799. In addition, it was able to squeeze in the 
time to deal with cases so that whereas in 2003 the average times to give a judgment were 
25,5 months for preliminary references and 24,7 months for direct actions, in 2010 the 
respective figures were 16,1 months and 16,7 months.153 In its Annual Report of 2010 the CJ 
lists as reasons for this the reforms of its working methods and the improvement in its 
efficiency due to the increased use of the various procedural instruments at its disposal (such 
as the introduction of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure and the possibility of giving a 
judgment without an opinion of the advocate general).154 The transfers of competence from 
the CJ to the GC following the Nice Treaty and the extra resources brought by the 
enlargements in 2004 and 2007 also figured among the reasons behind the CJ's successful 
case management.155  
 
                                                             
152 Annual Report of the CJEU 2010, p. 197. See also the report "The Workload of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union" of the House of Lords' European Union Committee, according to which "The CST has been a 
success story and the Committee has no concerns regarding its ability to manage its case-load" (paragraph 56). 
153 Source: Annual Report of the CJEC of 2003, p. 222 and Annual Report of the CJEU 2010, p. 96. 
154 Annual Report of the CJEU 2010, p. 96. For a detailed account of these measures see Jacobs (2004), p. 823 
and Naômé (2008). 
155 Rosas – Kaila (2010), p. 281. 
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However, the number of cases kept rising and many commentators were of the opinion that a 
workload crisis was looming in the near future.156 The balanced situation was partly due to 
the fact that the number of judges and advocates general had risen following the eastern 
enlargements in 2004 and 2007, but the new Member States did not generate cases with full 
speed yet. Most of their infringement procedures were still at the level of the administrative 
phase in the Commission, and their domestic courts did not have the habit of presenting 
preliminary references yet. In addition, the reforms brought by the Lisbon Treaty, such as the 
abolition of the pillar structure and the subsequent expansion of the area of the competence 
of the CJEU were bound to cause an increase in the number of new cases, but only at a later 
stage because the jurisdiction of the CJ to give preliminary rulings in the area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice was subject to a transitory period until 2014.157  Thus, it seemed 
probable that this "honeymoon" was not to last for long.158  
 
4.1.3 The situation of the General Court 
 
In the GC a workload crisis was not only looming in the future, but a striking reality. The GC 
was heavily overburdened and was struggling to keep its head above the surface. The effect 
of the establishment of the CST on the workload of the GC had been only marginal and 
temporary and it seemed that the positive effects brought it had been quickly outweighed by 
other factors. 
 
The GC had been already for a while making efforts to render its work more effective by 
internal measures and had in fact managed to improve its productivity159 but this did not 
prevent the stock of pending cases from growing and the handling times from lengthening. 
There were several reasons for this situation, such as the gradual expansion of the GC's 
                                                             
156 See e.g. Guinchard (2011), p. 992 and the report "The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union" of the House of Lords' European Union Committee, paragraph 44.  
157 Rosas – Kaila (2010), p. 282. 
158 See the report "The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union" of the House of Lords' 
European Union Committee, “Written evidence”, memorandum of professor Damian Chalmers, p. 16.  
159 In 2008 it was able to give 605 judgments whereas in 2007 the corresponding figure had been 397 (the 
Annual Report of the CJEU 2008, p. 171). 
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competences since its establishment, the expansion of EU's competences into new areas and 
the growth of litigation on areas such as competition, trademark and sanctions (officially 
called "restrictive measures")160, but also the increase in complexity and sophistication of 
cases.161 In a seminar held for the occasion of the 20th birthday of the GC on 25 September 
2009, President Jaeger took up the critical state of this tribunal and called for a reform. He 
drew attention to the slow but inexorable growth of the stock of pending cases which in turn 
caused lengthening on its handling times, which according to him is the real indicator of the 
health on a judicial system.162  
 
In the reference year 2010 the average duration of proceedings in the GC was in state aid 
cases 32,4 months and in competition cases 45,7 months.163 In 2009 the CJ handed down a 
judgement stating that competition proceedings before the GC, having lasted for five years 
and ten months, had infringed the principle according to which the case should be dealt with 
within a reasonable time.164 The CJ referred in its judgement to the second paragraph of 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: CFR) 
and to Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: ECHR) and noted also the then ongoing negotiations on 
the accession of the EU to the ECHR. 
 
The next year the situation was even worse. The number of new cases was in a heavy rise 
and the average handling time of a competition case in 2011 was a stunning 50,5 months. 
The GC stated in the Annual Report of 2011 that as all the possibilities for internal reform 
have already been fully exploited, a structural change is indispensable.165 Thus, by the turn of 
the decade it had become clear for everybody that the GC needed help.  
 
                                                             
160 See e.g. Alemanno and Pech (2017), p. 131. 
161 Tridimas (2018), p. 605. 
162 Jaeger (2009).  
163 Annual Report of the CJEU 2010, p. 183. In categories of "intellectual property" and "other direct actions" 
the average handling times were more reasonable (20,6 and 23,7 months respectively).   
164 Case C-385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt. See also an earlier case C-185/95, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. 
Commission, paragraph 47 (approximately 5 years and six months). 
165 Annual Report of the CJEU 2011, pp. 124−125.  
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4.1.4 Solutions proposed to the workload problems 
 
There were several possibilities for alleviating the workload of the CJ and/or of the GC 
without changing the Treaties. These included, first, adding the number of judges in the GC. 
According to Article 19(2) of the Treaty on the European Union166 (hereinafter: TEU) the 
"General Court shall include at least one Judge per Member State" and the number of judges 
could be altered by amending the Statute. Secondly, further specialised courts could be 
created on the basis of Article 257 TFEU. Thirdly, the competences of the respective parts of 
the judiciary could be altered by transfers of jurisdiction on the basis of Article 256 TFEU.167 
Fourthly, the CJ could reduce the number of new preliminary references by filtering them 
more effectively.168 In addition, both courts could carry out internal measures aimed at 
making their working methods more effective – which they had already been doing. 
 
Different contributions as to the solutions were presented, the most ambitious of which 
probably was the study conducted by the British House of Lords' EU Committee (hereinafter: 
EU Committee) in 2010−2011. The EU Committee heard a large number of witnesses 
representing the EU institutions, the lawyers, the academia and the industry and prepared on 
the basis of their contributions a comprehensive study with concrete proposals. The 
background information feeding into the final report illustrates well the range of views 
concerning the state of the EU's judiciary and the preferred solutions for its well-known 
problems.  
 
As regards the representatives of the "users" of the union courts, the CCBE stated in its 
written evidence that the situation regarding delays before the GC is unacceptable and that 
citizens as well as business community are unable to rely on effective judicial protection. The 
CCBE called for an urgent structural reform, either by increasing the number of judges at the 
                                                             
166 Treaty on the European Union (consolidated version), OJ 2012 C 326, p. 13. 
167 Nevertheless, this alternative could only be envisaged together with another measure such as adding the 
number of judges in the GC. In a situation where neither the GC nor the CJ had extra resources, transfers of 
jurisdiction would only move the centre of problems from one court to another.  
168 By, for instance, rewriting the CILFIT submission criteria or by filtering the appeals [see e.g. Rasmussen 
(2000), pp. 1107−1110]. 
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GC and creating a special chamber for trade mark cases, or by establishing a specialised 
tribunal for trade mark cases.169 The CCBE had already in summer 2010 drawn the attention 
of the Member States' governments to the urgency of a structural reform by sending a letter 
to the permanent representatives of Member States in the EU.170 The Confederation of British 
Industry stated that the average turnaround time for competition cases in the GC is 
unacceptable to companies171 and gave its strong support to the establishment of an 
intellectual property tribunal.172 In a similar vein, the European Circuit of the Bar of England 
and Wales saw that the courts are seeking to “operate a Rolls Royce with a Trabant motor” 
and continued the analogy by stating that either the motor should be upgraded or the car 
changed, for instance by creating a trade mark tribunal.173  
 
The opinions of the scholars followed the same path. Tridimas doubted whether the waiting 
period for litigants meets the standards of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, suggesting adding the 
number of the judges in the GC and/or creating specialist tribunals for trade mark, 
competition and state aid cases.174 Jacobs, on the other hand, ruled out adding the number of 
judges at the GC because he anticipated that the only politically viable possibility might be to 
double the number of judges, "which would be excessive". He gave his principled support to 
the creation of further specialised courts and proposed for the CJ a system whereby national 
court, when making a preliminary reference, would state its own provisional answer, which 
the CJ could endorse by giving a "green light".175 
 
                                                             
169 The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union, “Oral evidence with associated written 
evidence”, pp. 28−30. 
170 See e.g. Letter dated 8 July 2010 from José-Maria Davó-Fernández, CCBE President, to Sir Kim Darroch 
KCMG, Permanent Representative of United Kingdom to the European Union, Annex I of the written evidence 
provided by the CCBE, “Oral evidence with associated written evidence”, pp. 29−30.  
171 “Written evidence”, p. 9. The other contributions made by actors presenting the "users" of the EU courts also 
found the handling times unacceptable; see, for instance, the answer of Luis Romero Requena, Director-General 
of the Commission’s legal service, “Oral evidence with associated written evidence”, Q114 and Faculty of 
Advocates, “Written evidence”, p. 32. 
172 “Written evidence”, pp. 14−15. 
173 “Written evidence”, pp. 31−32. 
174 See the contributions by professor Tridimas and by EU Committee of the Law Society of England and 
Wales, ibid., p. 37 and p. 43. 
175 "Oral evidence with associated written evidence", pp. 55−57 and pp. 60−61. 
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The CJEU itself contributed to the report, acting "in a spirit of openness and loyalty" and 
pointing out the exceptional nature of providing such a contribution for a national parliament. 
In its memorandum the CJEU, after presenting the relevant statistical figures, recognised the 
need to consider structural remedies such as either the increase of the number of judges at the 
GC or the creation of a specialist court, potentially in the field of intellectual property 
(without specifying its preference).176 
 
In its final report177, published in 2011 the EU Committee concluded that the GC is in the 
middle of a workload crisis ("the GC's own statistical information, and the evidence we 
received, point to significant problems with its existing workload and its ability to manage its 
future workload") and the CJ on the verge of one. The EU Committee stated that structural 
solutions need to be found urgently and recommended the option of increasing the number of 
judges serving the GC.178 The EU Committee was confident that the Council can agree to 
appoint the necessary number of extra judges, for instance one third of the present number on 
a rotating basis.179 As regards the CJ, the EU Committee settled for recommending certain 
measures related to management of cases and, as a structural measure, adding the number of 
advocates general.180 The Committee expressly rejected the creation of more special tribunals 
as too inflexible but suggested that the GC should consider the use of specialist chambers.181 
 
4.2 The legislative procedure 
 
Inside the buildings of the court in Kirchberg, however, preparations for a reform were 
already ongoing. The GC itself had been convinced of the need for a structural solution 
already for a long time. It had started to prepare the issue in silence as early as in 2007, and 
had suggested in 2009 that the CJ would present a proposal for establishing a special tribunal 
                                                             
176 See the contribution of the CJEU, “Written evidence”, p. 30. 
177 The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union, House of Lords: European Union Committee, 
14th report of session 2010−2011. 
178 Ibid., point 53. 
179 Ibid., pp. 36−37.  
180 Ibid., p. 117. 
181 Ibid., p. 34. 
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in the area of intellectual property and trade marks (this was the only feasible way to act as 
the GC does not have an independent right on initiative).182 These cases were similar in 
nature and not related to core questions of the EU law and they were numerous, so 
transferring them would have a significant impact on the workload of the GC.  
 
The CJ reacted by instituting a common committee of the two courts, tasked to prepare a 
proposal to alleviate the workload of the GC. The committee delved into the question 
thoroughly and, as a result, the CJ launched a legislative proposal in April 2011.183 The 
proposal was based on the second paragraph of Article 281 TFEU which stipulates that the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting either at the request of the CJ and after 
consultation of the Commission, or vice versa, may amend the provisions of the Statute, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. Thus, this was the first time that 
the European Parliament would have a significant role in a process aiming at reforming the 
court system.  
 
4.2.1 The legislative proposal 
 
The document contained a series of amendments to the Statute, most of which related to the 
internal architecture of the two courts. Regarding the CJ itself, there were several proposals 
aimed at simplifying the process, in addition to which it was proposed to establish the office 
of vice-president of the CJ and to amend the rules relating to the composition of its grand 
chamber. However, the most interesting and the most radical amendments related to the 
internal architecture of the GC. The proposal included a solution that was fundamentally 
different from the one preferred by the GC itself. Instead of suggesting the creation of a new 
special tribunal the CJ proposed adding the number of judges in the GC by twelve (from 27 
to 39).  
                                                             
182 Jaeger (2017), p. 31. 
183 Draft amendments to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and to Annex I thereto (doc. 
8787/11 of the Council, 7.4.2011, as well as its ADD 1 containing an assessment of the financial impact of the 
proposed amendments). This proposal also included other parts related to inter alia the size and composition of 
the grand chamber of the CJ and the possibility to nominate additional judges of the CST. 
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In a detailed explanatory part it was explained why the CJ had, after a careful weighing up of 
the two options, come to the conclusion that an increase in the number of judges by twelve is 
"clearly preferable", for reasons relating to effectiveness, urgency, flexibility and consistency 
of EU law. The proposal was silent on the method of choosing the additional judges, as it is 
not a matter to be decided by the legislator. 
 
As regards effectiveness, the CJ stated that establishing a specialised court in the field of 
intellectual property would not, taking into account the volume of cases pending before the 
GC, resolve the overload but would "offer only a brief respite, as did the transfer of staff 
cases". Secondly, the CJ claimed that adding judges can be done more expediently than 
establishing a completely new tribunal, which is important considering the urgency of the 
situation (little did they know, as it finally took more than four years for the proposal to be 
adopted). Thirdly the CJ stressed the flexibility of the proposed solution, as in the GC it is 
possible to orient human resources according to where they are needed. In addition, 
increasing the number of judges does not rule out the creation of a specialist tribunal at some 
point, but it would be difficult to dismantle a new court once it had come into operation (also 
this argument seems different in retrospect, seeing that the CST was in fact dismantled). 
Fourthly, the CJ was worried that the creation of a trade mark tribunal would jeopardise the 
consistency of EU law because in addition to cases currently brought before the GC there are 
disputes relating to infringements or to national trade marks, which are brought before the CJ 
by references for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the relevant directives. 
 
A little later the CJ also lodged a document containing an assessment of the financial impact 
of the proposed addition of 12 judges.184 Both the direct costs of such amendment (such as 
remunerations and allowances of the new judges and their staff) and the infrastructure and 
operating costs were included. However, the costs related to the potential additional staff 
needed for certain services such as translation, interpreting, human resources etc. were left 
                                                             
184 Doc. 8787/11 ADD 1 of the Council, 2.5.2011 
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outside the assessment because of their uncertainty. The CJ estimated the costs of the 
proposal to be, in a normal year of operation, approximately 13.6 million euros.  
 
4.2.2 Year 2011 – a slow yet hopeful start 
 
The Council started the handling of the proposal promptly. The proposal was given to the 
working party "Court of Justice", where it faced, under the Hungarian presidency of the 
Council, a reception that could be qualified as sympathetic yet inquisitive. Even though the 
necessity of a structural reform was largely acknowledged, the financial implications of the 
reform were criticised, and some delegations openly preferred the option consisting of the 
establishment of a special trade mark tribunal. The method of designation of judges, which 
was to become the main reason for the prolonged examination of the proposal, also came up. 
This was hardly a surprise, as already for long various commentators had predicted such 
problems in case of a decision to add the number of judges in the GC.185  
 
The CJ reacted to these doubts by sending the (then Polish) Presidency of the Council in July 
a document clarifying "the reasons why, following a lengthy process of reflection involving 
the General Court, the Court of Justice has come to the conclusion that an increase in the 
number of Judges of the General Court is the only possible solution, both in terms of 
reducing the stock of pending cases and the time taken to deal with cases that are within the 
jurisdiction of the General Court, and of preserving the coherence of the judicial system of 
the European Union."186 The Registrar of the CJ, Alfredo Calot Escobar, also contributed by 
sending to the presidency a letter aimed at providing answers to some of the questions 
presented in the working group.187 The huge workload of the GC was illustrated by facts and 
                                                             
185 See for instance CFI President Vesterdorf in the Hanasaari conference on problems related to enlarging the 
CFI (Sundström and Kauppi (1998), pp. 199−200), Guinchard (2011) and Advocate General Jacobs, in the 
report "The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union" of the House of Lords' European Union 
Committee, document containing “Oral evidence with associated written evidence”, p. 55.  
186 Council doc. 12719/11 of 11 July 2011, Draft amendments to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and Annex I thereto – Further information concerning the proposal to increase the number of 
judges of the General Court. 
187 Doc. 16904/2011, Draft amendments to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and to 
Annex I thereto - Observations made by the Court of Justice in connection with the proceedings of 
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figures. For instance, in 2011 the registry had to enter a total of 44 000 procedural documents 
in the register and the files of cases under preparation occupied at the moment 505 linear 
metres. The letter also recounted meticulously all the internal measures taken by the GC to 
make its work more effective, in order to prove that every stone has been turned.  
 
The General Affairs Council discussed the proposal on 5 December 2011 on the basis of a 
note from the presidency in a short manner, without making any conclusions.188 
 
The Commission, for its part, gave its opinion on the proposal in September 2011.189 The 
Commission supported in general increasing the number of the GC judges (rather than 
creating a new special tribunal). Nevertheless, the Commission proposed some additional 
amendments aimed at enhancing the efficiency in the enlarged GC, such as inserting a 
provision according to which the GC should have an appropriate number (not fewer than 
two) of chambers specialised to certain subject-matters. The Commission also courageously 
proposed two alternative methods for choosing the additional judges. The first model, quite 
complicated, was based on an egalitarian rotating system while retaining the possibilities of 
renewal of terms as far as possible. The second model, no less cumbersome, was based on 
the first model but with the addition of taking into account the need for specialisation.  
 
4.2.3 Year 2012 – the problems start to escalate 
 
In the European Parliament the proposal was welcomed in a positive light and the rapporteur 
MEP Alexandra Thein (ALDE) found the arguments put forward by the CJ persuasive. 
However, the rapporteur suggested to split the handling of the proposal in two and to adopt 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the Council's Working Party on the Court of Justice on 14 October 2011, 14.11.2011. 
188 Doc. 17657/11, Reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Information from the 
Presidency.  
189 Commission opinion of 30.9.2011 on the requests for the amendment of the Statute of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, presented by the Court, COM(2011) 596 final. 
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only the less controversial parts, leaving the parts related to the GC reform to be handled at a 
later stage.190   
 
In the Council, during the first half of the year the Danish presidency tried to find a solution 
by proposing a lottery system for selecting the 12 judges but had no success.191 On the 
second half of the year the Cypriot presidency continued the efforts and the General Affairs 
Council discussed the proposal in its meeting of 10-11 December 2012. The press release of 
the meeting192 shortly described the compromise proposal of the presidency consisting of 
adding to the GC nine extra judges, with a system of designation based on two parallel 
systems of rotation. There would have been, according to the proposal, one "pool" consisting 
of six largest Member States that would designate four additional judges for two successive 
mandates and a second "pool" consisting of all the other Member States that would designate 
five judges for a single mandate. This complicated arrangement, in which Member States 
were divided into two unequal categories, did not get the necessary support in the Council. 
The press release stated that the presidency will inform the CJ that agreement has not been 
reached and that the Council awaits the proposal for new Rules of Procedure of the GC. 
Before the new Rules of Procedure have been adopted, the Council would not discuss the 
issue of judges.  
 
4.2.4 Year 2013 – an impasse 
 
In 2013 the European Parliament continued to act upon the proposal actively. The Committee 
on Legal Affairs (hereinafter: JURI Committee) discussed the matter in its meetings and 
                                                             
190 Report on the draft regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Protocol on the 
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Annex I thereto, 02074/2011 C7-0126/2012 – 
2011/0901B(COD), 5 June 2012. However, the proposals related to inter alia the creation of the office of vice-
president for both courts were adopted by the legislator in July 2012 (Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 741/2012 
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191 Jaeger (2017), p. 32. 
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organised a public hearing with CJ President Skouris on 24 April 2013 in Brussels.193 He 
expressed his concern over the difficult situation of the GC and the fact that despite the 
efforts made by several presidencies the Council had not managed to reach a political 
agreement on the method of designation of the additional judges. President Skouris stressed 
that the question of designation of judges belongs to the Member States, which is why the CJ 
has not made any proposals thereon. Nevertheless, he listed three fundamental elements that 
the future method, according to him, must fulfil. The key words were competence, stability 
and geographical balance. First, on the competence of judges President Skouris expressed 
his preference for a nomination method based on the merits of candidates rather than a purely 
geographical method. Secondly, as regards stability he warned the JURI Committee from 
opting for a system based on non-renewable mandates, for this would seriously harm the 
efficiency of the CG. Thirdly, he stressed the importance of the GC being composed in a 
balanced manner both as regards the geographical distribution of members and the 
representation of national legal systems.  
 
The JURI Committee adopted its final report on 10 July 2013194 and on 12 December 2013 
the European Parliament proceeded to a partial vote at 1st reading in the plenary.195 
According to the amendments adopted by the plenary there should be 12 additional judges in 
the GC, appointed exclusively on the basis of their professional and personal suitability, 
regardless of their nationality (however, there should be no more than two judges from one 
Member State). Nevertheless, the European Parliament did not fix its position in first reading 
but referred the issue back to the JURI Committee for re-consideration, and the vote on the 
legislative resolution was postponed. The reason for this was that the (Lithuanian) presidency 
of the Council had asked the European Parliament to postpone the vote on its position at first 
                                                             
193 Summary of the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) of the European Parliament, held in Brussels on 22, 24 
and 25 April 2013, Council doc. 9077/13 (Skouris’ speech in Annex I).  
194 Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 12 December 2013 on the draft regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union by increasing the number of judges at the General Court. [P7 TA(2013)0581]. 
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reading to keep the possibility open to start negotiations between the Council and the 
European Parliament in view of a first reading agreement.196 
 
However, in the Council the negotiations seemed to have reached an impasse, all the possible 
options having been explored without success. The suggestion of the Lithuanian presidency 
to gradually double the number of judges did not gain success.197  
 
In November 2013 the representatives of the incoming Greek presidency addressed President 
Skouris a letter announcing its intention to find a solution to the question of designation of 
judges during their presidency and asked the President to present in writing the same 
considerations he had already orally given in JURI Committee in April. President Skouris 
answered with a letter containing a memorandum with his reflections on a possible method of 
selection, together with a table illustrating how the proposed procedure would operate in the 
coming years.198 He pointed out that the JURI Committee had proposed a method based on 
the professional suitability of candidates and stated that also the CJ is of the opinion that the 
nationality of judges ought not to become the decisive factor determining the appointment, as 
all EU nationalities and all the legal orders of the EU already are represented in the GC. 
President Skouris went on to emphasize that the most important criterion should be 
professional competence which involves "an exceptional level of expertise in Union law, 
mastery of several official EU languages and the ability to work in a collegial and 
international environment". As to the number of judges he considered that the addition of 
nine judges would be sufficient at this point, considering the extra judge brought by the 
accession of Croatia in July 2013.  
 
Almost as if to underline the seriousness of the situation, the CJ gave in November 2013 
three judgments in which it found that the procedure in the GC had breached the second 
                                                             
196 See information note drafted by the General Secretariat of the Council: Draft Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union and Annex I thereto – Outcome of the European Parliament's proceedings (Strasbourg, 9 to 12 December 
2013), in doc. 17499/13 of 13 December 2013. 
197 Jaeger (2017), p. 33. 
198 In Council doc. 18107/13. 
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paragraph of Article 47 of the CFR by failing to comply with the requirement to adjudicate 
within a reasonable time.199  
 
4.2.5 Year 2014 – a political compromise  
 
The Greek presidency of the Council started immediately its efforts to find a compromise and 
the issue of extra judges was put on the agenda of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (hereinafter: Coreper) already in January. In its background note200 the 
presidency asked the Coreper to give it a mandate to start trialogues with the European 
Parliament so as to reach, prior to the elections in May 2014, a first reading agreement. 
According to the note the discussions with the European Parliament would be limited to the 
question of number of judges (nine), because the legislator has no competence in relation to 
the method of appointment and nomination of judges. The presidency also asked the Coreper 
to give a mandate to the working party "Court of Justice" to conduct in parallel discussions 
on the method of appointment of the extra judges.  
 
The mandates were given, and the discussions started. The JURI Committee endorsed in 
February by unanimity a compromise text, agreed in the trialogue, according to which the 
number of judges would be added by nine. The European Parliament proceeded by adopting 
in April 2014 a legislative resolution on the Court's initial proposal, thereby closing its first 
reading.201  
 
However, in the Council problems were not over. Although the method of appointment of the 
extra judges was discussed in the Coreper several times in March on the basis of a proposal 
from the Greek presidency for a merit-based model with an element of rotation, there was no 
                                                             
199 See judgments in cases C-58/12 P, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, paragraph 96, C-50/12 P, Kendrion v 
Commission, paragraph 106 and C-40/12 P, Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission, paragraph 102. 
200 Note from the presidency to the Coreper (part 2), doc. 5355/14 of 15 January 2014, "Reform of the General 
Court of the European Union". 
201 European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 April 2014 on the draft regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union by increasing the number of Judges at the General Court (02074/2011 – C7-0126/2012 –
 2011/0901B(COD)), of 15 April 2014.  
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agreement. The reason for this was that certain small and/or “new” Member States could not 
accept any kind of merit-based approach proposed by President Skouris, out of fear that in 
such a system their nationals would not be represented (despite the fact that every Member 
State would naturally have continued to have at least one judge at every given moment).202 
Even though legally it would have been possible to adopt the legislative act without knowing 
how the extra judges were to be appointed, politically this was unthinkable. Thus, in April 
2014 after one more failed effort the Greek presidency acknowledged in its letter to President 
Skouris the impossibility of reaching an agreement. The presidency stated, frustrated, that 
any solution including a number of posts which is lower than the number of Member States 
would most likely face the same difficulties.203 After this failed effort the reform was 
generally considered to be dead and buried and the mood was depressed and deeply 
disappointed. The then Vice-President of the CJ Lenaerts stated in a CCBE Conference in 
April 2014 that “[i]n terms of the EU Courts’ structure I am not optimistic that any reform 
will be possible in the near future”204 and Judge Rosas affirmed at a Conference held at 
Fordham University School of Law in New York City that the reform initiative seemed 
dead.205 
 
Nevertheless, to everybody’s surprise in the latter half of 2014 the phoenix rose from the 
ashes. The Italian presidency of the Council asked the CJ to present new suggestions and the 
CJ answered in November 2014 with a completely novel idea, based on doubling the number 
of judges of the GC in three stages by 2019 and on abolishing the CST.206 The CJ motivated 
its "upgraded proposal of 2014" (as this document will be called in this paper) mainly by the 
fact that the legislator had not been able to agree on its first proposal while the distress of the 
GC kept getting worse and the first actions for damages caused by breaches of the reasonable 
                                                             
202 Abenhaïm (2014a) and Jaeger (2017), p. 33. Some insight into the way of thinking of these Member States is 
provided in Hadroušek and Smolek (2015), pp. 195−198.  
203 See e.g. intervention of Marc Jaeger in CCBE, Proceedings of the Conference “EU Courts – Looking 
Forward”, p. 43. 
204 Keynote speech of Koen Lenaerts in CCBE, Proceedings of the Conference “EU Courts – Looking 
Forward”, p. 7. 
205 Jaeger (2017), pp. 33−34. 
206 Response of the Court of Justice to the Presidency's invitation to present new proposals on the procedures for 
increasing the number of Judges at the General Court of the European Union (doc. 14448/1/14 of the Council, 
20.11.2014). 
49 
 
time principle by the GC had already been brought.207 On the other hand the CJ referred to 
the fact that there had in recent years been constant problems in filling the vacancies at the 
CST, due to problems in the Council to agree on the nationality of the new judge or judges to 
be nominated. The requirement of a balanced composition of the CST "on as broad a 
geographical basis and as broad a representation of the national legal systems as possible" 
had turned against itself and had opened the door to endless disputes that risked paralysing 
the whole institution.208 The CJ noted in its proposal that two CST nominations were still 
pending even though the term of office of the previous judges had expired already two 
months ago. The proposal also explained, in a section called "lack of alternatives", in a 
thorough manner why the option of creating new special tribunals is not a feasible one. The 
estimated cost burden of increasing the numbers of judges at the GC, in a normal year of 
operation, would according to the document be 22.9 million euros.  
 
The Italian presidency drafted swiftly on this basis a document entitled "Reform of the 
General Court – Way forward"209 which included the main elements of the CJ's new 
proposal, as well as some additional measures designed to alleviate the budgetary 
implications (such as reducing the number of legal secretaries and assistants). The Coreper 
reached in December an agreement in principle and endorsed this document to serve as a 
basis for further work.210  
 
Nevertheless, nearly not everyone was happy with the CJ's new proposal and criticism kept 
flowing from different actors. Even though no sufficient minority was reached to block the 
agreement in principle in the Council, a significant number of Member States were opposed 
to it.211 Finland was also among the critical Member States, disputing the proportionality of 
                                                             
207 The CJ referred to cases T-479/14 Kendrion v Court of Justice of the European Union and T-577/14 
Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH and Gascogne v Court of Justice of the European Union. 
208 See, for instance Hadroušek and Smolek (2015), pp. 188−206, Peers (2014) and Peers (2015).  
209 Doc. 16576/14 of 8 December 2014. 
210 See, for instance doc. 6752/15, pp. 3−4. 
211 See Quatremer (2015).  
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the doubling of the number of judges.212 However, when it became apparent that the blocking 
minority in the Council would not be reached, Finland did not vote against the proposal.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting objection came from the side of the GC. The text of the proposal 
revealed that the plenary meeting of the GC had stated its preference for the establishment of 
a specialised trademark court and for the status quo to be maintained as regards the CST. In 
addition, President Jaeger declared in his letter to the Italian presidency his strong opposition 
towards the proposal and stated that there are more appropriate, more effective and less 
onerous means by which to strengthen the GC and to achieve better and faster outcome for 
litigants.213 President Skouris answered with an angry letter in which he accused President 
Jaeger of "lack[ing] respect for institutional rules".214 
 
In the European Parliament the new solution raised criticism among the members of the JURI 
Committee that announced that it would visit Luxembourg in order to take stock of the 
situation.215  
 
4.2.6 Year 2015 – the reform takes shape in the midst of conflicts 
 
Spring 2015 was the time of intense negotiations on the practical implementation of the 
political agreement reached in the Council. The CJEU gave in April a press release in which 
it explained the proposed solution, stressing the crucial importance of carrying out the reform 
and underlining that the GC was "not able to cope, in a sustainable and efficient manner, with 
the number and increased complexity of cases that must be heard".216 The Coreper continued 
                                                             
212 For Finland's positions see E-jatkokirje "Euroopan unionin tuomioistuimen ehdotus tuomioistuimen 
perussäännön ja sen liitteen I muutoksiksi; yleisen tuomioistuimen tuomarien määrän nostaminen", UM2014-
01470. 
213 President Jaeger's letter of 9 December 2014 to Stefano Sannino (permanent representative of Italy to the 
EU). See e.g. Robinson (2015b).  
214 See e.g. Robinson (2015c). 
215 Summary record of the meeting of the European parliament Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), held on 
Brussels on 24 September 2014 (in Council doc. 13756/14 of 30 September 2014). 
216 Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 44/2015, 28.4.2015. Later many writers have 
claimed that this was not entirely true, as following a series of internal measures the GC had found ways to 
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to examine the question of nomination of judges. There seemed to be a high level of 
confidence for reaching an agreement, as the Coreper proceeded to organising in March a 
"lottery" in order to determine which Member States had the right to nominate the first 12 
judges.  
 
In the European Parliament the mood was quite different and had changed from its initial 
constructive optimism to open criticism. The new rapporteur MEP António de 
Sousa Marinho e Pinto (ALDE) was very critical towards the new proposals of the CJ, which 
he found to be unnecessary and too expensive, especially when at the same time several 
Member States were, because of the global financial crisis, compelled to drastically reduce 
their public spending. Many other members of the JURI Committee also presented sceptical 
views.217 In March Marinho e Pinto addressed to the Council presidency an angry letter218, 
deploring the lack of impact analysis concerning the new proposal and stating that from "any 
common-sense perspective" doubling the number of judges cannot be compared to an 
increase of 12 judges. The rapporteur also drew attention to the fact that the abolition of the 
CST was a fundamental alteration in the EU's judicial architecture, and yet it was being 
proposed without conducting the analysis required by Declaration 14 annexed to the Treaty 
of Nice.219 According to the rapporteur, the sole purpose of the abolition was that it allowed 
arguing that only 21 new posts were created. As a conclusion the rapporteur stated that the 
CJEU had given a completely new proposal which must be treated in accordance with the 
correct institutional procedures. The rapporteur ended his letter by deeply regretting the fact 
that the Council had already organised a lottery deciding the 12 first Member States to get an 
additional judge, which according to him constituted a breach of the decision-making 
procedure and undermined the principle of loyal co-operation, amounting to an attack on the 
rights of the legislator.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
better cope with its workload and managed in 2015 to close more cases than new cases were coming in (see 
section 5.2.1). 
217 See summary record of the meeting of the European parliament Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), held on 
Brussels on 23-24 February 2015 (in Council doc. 6752/15 of 3 March 2015). 
218 Attached to the Council doc. 8484/15 of 29 April 2015. 
219 "The Conference considers that when the Council adopts the provisions of the Statute which are necessary to 
implement Article 225(2) and (3), it should put a procedure in place to ensure that the practical operation of 
those provisions is evaluated no later than three years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice." 
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The Latvian presidency of the Council answered with a letter dated on 22 April 2015, stating 
that it does not share the views of the rapporteur and assuring, as regards the "lottery", that 
the intention was not to create a "fait accompli" but simply to ensure by this preparatory 
measure so as to appoint swiftly the first additional judges, when there is an agreement 
between the European Parliament and the Council.220  
 
However, the two branches of the legislator were not only ones that were in the middle of a 
conflict; the smouldering disagreement inside the CJEU had also burst into flames. Chairman 
of the JURI Committee, Pavel Svoboda, had invited Presidents Skouris and Jaeger as well as 
some judges to be heard. President Skouris answered with a letter where he politely reminded 
of the various occasions where the CJEU has provided the European Parliament with 
information. He accepted the invitation but stated that with the participation of (only) himself 
and President Jaeger the meeting "will certainly have an appropriate format" and stressed 
that "it is for me to suggest the presence, if any" of other Members of the CJ and of the GC at 
the meeting.221  
 
However, the JURI Committee ignored the wish of President Skouris and organised on 28 
March 2015 a closed-door meeting, debating the issue in the absence of President Skouris 
and on the basis of a presentation by President Jaeger and interventions from four judges of 
the GC (Irena Pelikánová, Franklin Dehousse, Guido Berardis and Anthony Michael 
Collins).222 All four judges were openly critical towards the reform and spoke in opposition 
of the doubling. According to them, “[i]ncreasing, let alone doubling, the number of judges at 
the General Court is yesterday’s solution for yesterday’s problem". In his intervention Judge 
Collins stated that the CST "is widely acknowledged as being a success from both a 
qualitative and quantitative perspective" and that it "appears to enjoy the confidence of the 
staff, their representatives and the institutions". Judge Pelikánová spoke about the practical 
usefulness of "a pyramid court system, as provided for by the Treaties" and Judge Berardis 
                                                             
220 Attached to the Council doc. 8484/15 of 29 April 2015. 
221 Letter of President Skouris is linked to the blog posting Robinson (2015c). 
222 See e.g. Jaeger (2017), p. 31 and Heath (2015a).  
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presented some figures to demonstrate that, in reality, only a very small number of pending 
cases can be considered as “backlog” and claimed that many chambers already have a 
caseload below their capacity.223  
 
It is hardly a surprise that all this severely irritated President Skouris. The last straw that 
broke the camel's back was an e-mail sent by the rapporteur Marinho e Pinto to the personnel 
of the European Parliament putting into question the statistical information provided earlier 
by the CJEU and claiming that the backlog was less severe than had been portrayed.224 
President Skouris reacted by sending to the President of the European Parliament Martin 
Schulz a letter deeply deploring the behaviour of the rapporteur in respect of the reform.225  
 
Despite the tumultuous atmosphere the legislator continued and, against all odds, managed to 
reach an early second reading agreement. The Council adopted its position at first reading in 
June.226 The very same day the rapporteur Marinho e Pinto distributed widely a bundle of 
documents among which figured a paper by the CJ, containing statistical information in order 
to prove the necessity and proportionality of the reform. Nevertheless, the rapporteur also 
distributed another document, consisting of a commentary of the CJ's paper by GC Judge 
Berardis, commissioned by the rapporteur himself. The latter document disputed, with strong 
language, the information provided for and the conclusions drawn by the CJ. This, for 
understandable reasons, made President Skouris furious.227  
 
                                                             
223 According to him, only the cases exceeding the normal timeframe of 24 months constitute a “backlog”. A 
link to all the interventions can be found through Heath (2015b). 
224 See Robinson (2015d).  
225 A scanned version of the letter is inserted in the blog post referred to in the previous footnote. 
226 Doc. 9375/1/15. 
227 President Skouris took immediate action against Judge Berardis, see Robinson (2015e). Later Judge Berardis 
was summoned to appear before a "code of conduct committee convened by the President of the Court of 
justice", the legal basis of which was not clear [see Dehousse (2016a), 38]. The following year the CJ adopted 
of a "Code of Conduct for Members and former Members of the Court of Justice of the European Union, OJ 
2016 C 483, p. 1). The Code contains rules concerning inter alia discretion and the duty loyalty of members 
towards the institution. Article 6(4) of the Code stipulates that "[m]embers shall refrain from making any 
statement outside the Institution which may harm its reputation" and Article 7(2) that "[m]embers shall comply 
with their duty to exercise discretion in dealing with judicial and administrative matters". The task of ensuring 
the proper application of the Code is entrusted to the care of the president, assisted by a consultative committee 
composed of the three members of the CJ who have been longest in office and the vice-president (Article 10). 
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However, despite the efforts of the rapporteur and the GC judges to hamper the project, the 
proposal was finally largely supported by the political groups.228 The plenary adopted the 
legislative resolution of the European Parliament on 28 October 2015229 and the Council 
approved the act on 3 December 2015.230 The Commission gave its positive opinion on 12 
November 2015.231 The act (Regulation 2015/2422 contained the amendments to Protocol No 
3 on the Statute as to the number of judges, as well as the necessary transitional measures) 
was signed on 16 December and published on Christmas Eve.232  
 
Unlike many other acts that are results of a difficult process, Regulation 2015/2422 is 
actually quite clear and simple. Article 48 of the Statute, concerning the composition of the 
GC, is replaced by a text whereby the GC shall consist of 40 judges as from 1 September 
2015, of 47 judges as from 1 September 2016 and of two judges per Member State as from 1 
September 2019. Recital 9 of the preamble of the Regulation 2015/2422 discloses that the 
seven posts of extra judges in September 2016 are transferred from the CST. The only real 
signs indicating that there were controversies surrounding the process are in the recital 13 as 
well as Article 3 of the Regulation 2015/2422 according to which the CJEU is expected to 
draw two reports; by 26 December 2017 on "possible changes to the distribution of 
competence for preliminary rulings" and by 26 December 2020 on the "efficiency of the 
General Court, the necessity and effectiveness of the increase to 56 judges, the use and 
effectiveness of resources and the further establishment of specialised chambers and/or other 
structural changes." The handprint of the European Parliament is visible especially in recital 
11 of the preamble, stressing the need to ensure gender balance within the GC.  
 
                                                             
228 See Alemanno and Pech (2017), p. 139. 
229 P8 TA(2015)0377. 
230 See the press release of the Council meeting, No 886/15.  
231 Opinion of the Commission pursuant to Article 294(7)(c) of the TFEU, on the European Parliament's 
amendments to the Council's position on the proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and of the 
Council amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, COM(2015) 569 
final of 12.11.2015. 
232 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 
amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, OJ 2015 L 341, p. 14. 
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4.3 The implementation of the reform 
 
The formal implementation of the reform was simple; the CJ had presented a new proposal 
containing the amendments necessary for the transfer to the GC of the jurisdiction at first 
instance in staff cases already before the formal adoption of the reform, in November 
2015.233 The handling of this proposal (that was more of a technical formality at this point) 
was quite simple and Regulation 2016/1192 was approved by the legislator in first reading in 
July 2016234, allowing the abolition of the CST according to the original time table on 1st 
September 2016.  
 
However, as was to be expected, the concrete implementation of the reform, that is the 
nomination of new judges, did not proceed exactly in the time-table provided for in 
Regulation 2015/2422. Without going into detail on the numerous problems related to 
different candidatures and the transfer of posts from the CST it can be summarised that 
although eleven of the twelve additional judges provided for under the first stage of the 
reform were appointed in the course of 2016, the last (Slovak) appointment was still missing 
as of May 2018.235 However, the second phase, directly related to the abolishment of the 
CST, was completed in 2017.236  
 
Finally, the expansion of the GC also had a less debated physical aspect: President Lenaerts 
told in his foreword of the Annual Report 2016 that the first stone of the "third tower" of the 
CJEU buildings was symbolically laid on 27 June 2016.237 
 
 
                                                             
233 Doc. 14306/15, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transfer to 
the General Court of the European Union of jurisdiction at first instance in disputes between the Union and its 
servants.  
234 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/1192 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on the 
transfer to the General Court of jurisdiction at first instance in disputes between the European Union and its 
servants, OJ 2016 L 200, p. 137.  
235 The Annual Report of the CJEU 2016, p. 8 and the Annual Report of the CJEU 2017, p. 12. 
236 The Annual Report 2017, 10. It should be stressed that formally only the posts of judges, not the individual 
judges, were transferred from the CST to the GC (although some Member States chose as their candidate the 
person who had their nationality and was judge at the CST at the time of its abolishment).   
237 Annual Report 2016, p. 9. 
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5 Assessment of the latest reform 
 
As the previous sections have shown, the structure of the CJEU has, unlike that of the other 
main institutions of the EU, been changed several times over the years to meet the new 
challenges brought by, most importantly, expansions of the EU's area and of its powers. The 
main reason behind all the modifications of the CJEU has been the need to give the judiciary 
tools to better handle its constantly growing case load. The latest reform, however, seems to 
differ from the previous ones in one important aspect: the unprecedented wave of critique it 
has faced. Therefore, the CJEU not only has to make the reform work successfully, but also 
convince the outside world that it works.  
 
5.1 An overview of the discussion following the reform 
 
This section is devoted to an overview of what has been written of the reform. The general 
tone of these comments is negative; the reform has been criticized “with a level of animosity 
hardly envisaged in past debates about the Union’s judicial system”238 and most of the 
positive comments have been made by people representing the CJEU itself (although even 
among them there have been those who have criticised it). In addition to contributions by 
outside commentators, as explained earlier in section 4.2.4, the cross-blaming between the 
representatives of various institutional actors involved in the process reached a nearly 
tragicomic level. 
 
Throughout the legislative procedure the press and the blogosphere, usually not very 
interested in the organisational structure of the CJEU, have feasted on the details of this 
lengthy drama, remembering to bring into daylight not only the inability of the legislator to 
reach an agreement but also the embarrassing disagreements inside the CJEU. The titles of 
the various articles and blog posts speak for themselves: "Don't mention the extra judges! 
When CJEU reform turns into farce"239, "La justice européenne au bord de la crise de 
                                                             
238 Sarmiento (2017), p. 236. 
239 Peers (2015). 
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nerfs"240, "The 1st rule of the ECJ's fight club… is about to be broken"241, "Guerre des nerfs 
sur les moyens de la Cour de justice européenne"242 and "Where do we stand on the reform 
of the EU's Court system? On a reform as short-sighted as the attempts to force through its 
adoption"243. As regards academic articles, Alemanno and Pech have published244, in addition 
to numerous blog posts and press articles, an extensive and highly critical piece in which they 
present their views on all the things that went wrong245 and Sarmiento has contributed with a 
somewhat more positive and constructive article.246  
 
However, the most eager commentator and critic has throughout the process been Judge 
Dehousse (judge in the GC from 2003 to 2016) who between 2011 and 2017 published a 
series of four exhaustive papers in which he criticizes the reform from all possible angles.247  
The intensity of his critique and lobbying against the reform while still employed by the GC 
as well the fact that he now has filed an action before the GC against the CJEU for not giving 
him access to certain documents containing information on the internal (mis)management of 
the latter248 lead one to think that a person who clearly is on a quest against his former 
employer might not be the most objective commentator. Still, as a former longstanding GC 
judge he undeniably is in a position to analyse the reform and its possible consequences. 
 
5.1.1 On the process 
 
The process leading to the adoption of the reform has been criticised heavily. The conduct of 
the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament has been condemned by many 
writers. That fact that initially these institutions thought that 12 or 9 was an appropriate 
                                                             
240 Quatremer (2015). 
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number of extra judges but ended up accepting 28 of them (or 21, if the posts transferred 
from the CST are deducted), for the simple reason of the Council not being able to create a 
rotation system and precisely at the time when the GC had managed to boost its effectiveness 
significantly249, was not left unnoticed by commentators.250 The Member States’ behaviour in 
the Council has been generally judged as egoistic, and also tragically descriptive of the 
current state of the EU.251 It has also been claimed that the essential procedural requirements 
were interpreted if not in an illegal, at least in an unorthodox manner by the legislator. The 
commentators also brought into daylight the chronological hick-ups of the process, such as 
the opinion of the Commission being based on the original proposal of 2011, materially very 
different from the proposal of October 2014, and the upgraded proposal of 2014 not being 
forwarded to national parliaments.252 Moreover, the process has been said to lack a 
transparent and informed debate. It has been said that the legislative procedure was 
conducted by the legislator too hastily and in secret, by ignoring some of the basic procedural 
requirements such as the relevant persons having the necessary language versions at their 
disposal.253 Finally, both the Commission and the Council have been obliged to comment 
their lack of action concerning an impact assessment study and a proper cost-benefit -
analysis, following written questions from MEP’s.254 
 
In addition to outside commentators, also the representatives of the CJEU have criticised the 
legislator. The frustration of President Skouris towards the legislator can be discerned from 
the various letters that he addressed to the changing Council presidencies and to the 
                                                             
249 See infra sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.1. 
250 See, for instance, blog posts Peers (2015), Abenhaïm (2014b) and Alemanno and Pech (2015b). 
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254 Jozo Radoš (ALDE), Question for written answer to the Council, Subject: More judges for the Court of 
Justice: impact assessment, 13 May 2015, E-007778/2015 and the reply of the Council, as well as António 
Marinho e Pinto (ALDE), 23 March 2015, E-004583-15, and the reply of the Commission.  
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European Parliament throughout the process, trying to convince them of the urgency of the 
situation and suggesting solutions. President Jaeger has not stayed silent either. He described 
in a conference held in 2014, when the whole project seemed to be stuck, his personal 
feelings towards the legislator with the expressions "big waste [of time and energy]", 
"profound perplexity" and "light irritation". He especially expressed his bewilderment over 
the fact that the Member States were not able to agree on a method of distribution of posts in 
a situation as critical as the one at hand. Another thing that irritated him was the conduct of 
"certain institutional actors" that were trying to intervene in the way the GC organises itself 
internally.255 By this he doubtlessly referred to the Commission that had in various occasions 
suggested ways to improve the efficiency of the GC maintaining inter alia that the creation 
of specialist chambers in the GC is a must.  
 
However, the CJEU was not only a critic of the process but also the subject of criticism itself. 
As explained supra especially in sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, there were severe disagreements 
inside the CJEU as to the basic solutions of the reform. Several writers highlighted the 
disputes between the two presidents remarking that the manner in which President Skouris 
was leading the project painted the image of an authoritarian institution in which dissenting 
voices are silenced.256 Moreover, one writer even weighed in a conspiracy theory according 
to which he had persuaded Germany to give its support to the CJ's new proposal by offering 
in exchange a positive outcome in the so called Gauweiler257 case.258 The manner in which 
the proposals for changes of the Statute are prepared inside the Council has also been 
criticised as being distorted for the advantage of the CJ.259 Finally, as the Council and the 
Commission, also the CJEU has been criticised for its reluctance to conduct a meaningful 
impact assessment study and a serious costs/benefits analysis of the possible solutions.260  
 
                                                             
255 CCBE, Proceedings of the Conference “EU Courts – Looking Forward”, pp. 43−44.  
256 See, blog posts Peers (2015), Robinson (2015c), Alemanno and Pech (2015a) and Robinson (2015d).  
257 A preliminary reference presented by the German constitutional court, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler. 
258 Quatremer (2015). 
259 For a detailed description of the institutional debate surrounding the reform see infra, section 5.2.6 
260 See, for instance, Alemanno and Pech (2017), pp. 143−145 and Croft (2014) (referring to a speech by Judge 
van der Woude). 
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As for comparative analysis, Judge Dehousse devoted his third Egmont paper, “The Brilliant 
Alternative Approach of the European Court of Human Rights”261 to comparing the reform 
process to that of the ECtHR, which he describes as being conducted in a more democratic, 
inclusive and transparent manner (resulting in a reform that was “more global, more 
economical and more flexible”).262 
 
5.1.2 On extra judges 
 
Already before the latest reform, several authors had had doubts about adding the number of 
judges and had expressed fears as to the operability of a court composed of a significantly 
bigger number of judges than there are Member States. Van Gerven warned already in 1996 
against the creation of a "mammoth court", talking about the "fatal spiral of one judge per 
Member State regardless of objective needs" that may "even lead to duplication". He also 
referred to Judge Koopmans who has claimed that the number of judges and advocates 
general is one of the worst methods of increasing productivity.263 Iannone asked in her article 
in 2005 if a Court composed of 30 or so members does not risk losing the coherence 
necessary to ensure the uniform interpretation of the rules of the legal order that is already 
characterised by a large heterogeneity, drawing attention also to the fact that such a large 
court no longer is able to sit in plenary session.264  
 
As regards the reform at hand, in addition to these concerns of a more general nature, many 
commentators noted the fact that the GC had been able to take a big productivity leap in the 
years preceding the reform without the help of any extra judges.265 Whereas the GC in 2010 
was able to complete 527 cases, in 2015 its productivity had augmented so as to allow the 
completion of as much as 987 cases. This staggering development was the result of a series 
of internal measures taken by the GC throughout the past ten years in order to make its work 
                                                             
261 Dehousse (2016a). 
262 Dehousse (2016b).  
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264 Iannone (2005), p. 163. 
265 See e.g. Peers (2015) and Alemanno and Pech (2017), pp. 152−155.  
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more effective, such as the possibility of ruling on intellectual property cases without a 
hearing, the implementation of a monitoring system regarding the respect of internal 
deadlines, the reform of writing methods of various judicial documents, and the development 
of new technologies in the daily exchange of documents266 as well as the recruitment of nine 
additional legal secretaries (one per Chamber) at the beginning of 2014.267 In addition, the 
press in some Member States raised the price tag of the reform into the public sphere in a 
vociferous manner.268  
 
Hence, it was no surprise that many, among them a group of GC judges and the rapporteur of 
the European Parliament for this file, Marinho e Pinto, stated that the addition of judges was 
disproportionate and unnecessary. According to the rapporteur no one could, in good faith, 
believe that the expensive exercise of doubling the number of judges is in any reasonable 
relation with the problem of outstanding GC cases.269  According to some, a reform package 
consisting of the appointment of more staff at the registry or translation services and/or more 
référendaires, would have satisfactorily addressed the problems identified by the CJ at a 
significantly lower cost.270  
 
In addition, there were those who claimed that the current problems of the GC do not actually 
stem from its case load, but are rather linked to questions of a more administrative nature, 
relating to for instance lack of stability in the composition of the GC, problems in its general 
case management as well as challenges of multilingualism.271 Many thought that the real 
challenge facing the GC is more qualitative than quantitative in nature272 and were of the 
view that adding the number of judges in the GC was a “yesterday’s solution to yesterday’s 
problems”, as the four rebellious GC judges appearing before the European Parliament 
                                                             
266 See Jaeger (2017), p. 25. 
267 The Annual Report of the CJEU 2014, p. 123. 
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271 See e.g. Alemanno and Pech (2015a) and Dehousse (2011). 
272 Alemanno and Pech (2015a) and Abenhaïm (2014a). 
62 
 
snapped (see supra section 4.2.6). Moreover, president Jaeger himself stated that “[t]here are 
more appropriate, more effective and less onerous means by which to strengthen the General 
Court and to achieve better and even faster outcome for litigants.”273 He also drew attention 
to the problems that the increased input from the GC could cause to the CJ as well as to the 
burden that the expansion of the GC will cause to the administrative services such as 
translations, interpretation and registry.274 
 
Finally, the inflexibility of the solution based on adding judges has been brought up. Even 
though the CJ in its proposal presented the addition of judges as the more flexible option 
compared with the creation of specialised chambers, in practice the abolishment of existing 
positions of judges is, in political reality, an unlikely event.275 
 
5.1.3 On the abolition of the CST 
 
The abolition of the CST came somewhat as a surprise because this organ is considered a 
success in many ways.  The CST coped well with its workload and was praised especially for 
enhancing the protection of fundamental rights of workers and protection of temporary staff 
against dismissal276. The CST introduced indirect applicability of directives in relations 
between the institutions and their staff277, improved the objectivity of selection procedures of 
the personnel278 and alleviated the burden of proof imposed of the plaintiff in cases 
concerning psychological harassment.279 Among the general merits of the CST have also 
been mentioned the speediness of its procedures280, good procedural economy and 
productivity281 and benefits brought by specialized judges. Vandersanden has stated that 
putting emphasis by the selection committee on candidates' specialisation to European civil 
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275 See Dehousse (2011), p. 29. 
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service law, administrative law and social law led to the CST developing to a "high-quality 
jurisdiction that gave new and enriching impulse to European civil service case law".282 
 
Hence, it was to be expected that the decision to abolish the CST raised critical comments. 
First, there were comments of an institutional nature, referring to Article 19 TEU according 
to which "[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, 
the General Court and specialised courts" and Article 257(1) TEFU that lays down the 
procedure for the establishment of special tribunals. At the time of the establishment of the 
CST the general presumption was that this was only the first of several special tribunals and 
that the structure of the community judicature would in the future be three-level.283 Thus, the 
proponents of the preservation of the CST have claimed that observing the spirit, or even the 
letter, of the Treaties demands that there be three layers to the CJEU. It has also been 
questioned whether there is a legal basis for abolition of a special tribunal.284  
 
Secondly, the practical consequences of the abolishment have been debated at length. 
Especially the representatives of the users of the CST regretted the abolishment. The Union 
syndicale fédérale des Services publics européens et internationaux gave in a resolution its 
strong support to preserving the CST, underlining the fact that its judges were chosen taking 
account of their specialisation in civil service law and social law, which would be lost in the 
GC285, whose judges tend to be business-law oriented generalists.286 The EPSU (European 
Public Service Union) has also been deeply concerned about the future of the civil service 
litigation in the EU, noting inter alia that “in a court in which Economic Law and huge 
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283 See e.g. Lavranos (2005), Dehousse (2011), p. 30 and Rosas − Kaila (2006), p. 78. See also Lotarski (2004), 
p. 721.  
284 See e.g. Alemanno and Pech (2017), pp. 150−152. In addition to their own views the authors point out that 
MEP Marinho e Pinto as well as trade unions have deplored the fact that the will of the fathers of the Treaties 
has not been respected (see for instance the letter of Union syndicale fédérale des Services publics européens et 
internationaux addressed to the European parliament on 9 July 2015). 
285 “Resolution on the recasting of the EU's judicial framework and the planned abolition of the Civil Service 
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financial stakes prevail, Civil Service cases would look like a poor relative, unrewarding for 
the judges who would be placed in these Chambers”.287  
 
On the other hand, some have recognised the repeated problems in nominating the judges for 
the CST as a valid argument pleading for its abolishment and for rejecting the option of 
creating more special tribunals. As one commentator stated in relation to this question: 
“There’s no point hoping that national egos will go away; they won’t”.288  
 
However, it is noteworthy the CJ in its proposal did not touch upon the institutional 
significance of the abolition of the CST nor the effects it would have for the legal protection 
of civil servants. It only referred to the fact that ever since its establishment there have been 
growing disagreements as to the role of the committee responsible for examining applications 
and the application (or not) of the rotation principle. President Lenaerts has also unofficially 
stated that there were years when the CST only had little work.289  
 
It is well known that the GC was opposed to the abolishment of the CST. It was a complete 
opposite of the solution preferred by the GC, consisting of creating more special tribunals 
alongside the CST to solve its workload problem. In addition, without the CST the GC 
ceased to be an appellate court, which President Jaeger has considered to be an essential 
feature of the present-day architecture of CJEU.290 It is interesting to note, however, that the 
CST itself did not oppose to its abolishment but obediently aligned its position with the CJ.291 
Perhaps the CST simply acquiesced to the proposal of the CJ because that is how the system 
works from an institutional point of view. Or maybe Peers was right in suggesting that the 
judges of the CST, after years of dealing with civil service cases, were actually looking 
                                                             
287 A memorandum of the EPSU of 14 December 2014, “No to abolishing the CST!”. The same view seems to 
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forward to ruling also on “bolshy Belarussians and money-grubbing monopolists” rather than 
keeping their own court.292  
 
5.1.4  The plea of the defence 
 
The CJ openly admitted both in its upgraded proposal of 2014 and in other occasions that the 
magical number 28 follows from the fact that any other number of extra judges turned out to 
be a political no-go. However, it has persistently held that this is not a disproportionate 
number, at least not in the long run. The CJ stated in its press release in April 2015 that the 
proposal not only meets the immediate needs of the GC, but also seeks to strengthen the 
effectiveness of the European Court system as a whole in a sustainable manner.293  
 
Naturally, President Lenaerts has been persistently defending the reform in different fora. In 
the foreword of Annual report of the CJEU 2015 he assured that the reform will enable the 
institution to "continue to fulfil its task in the interests of European litigants while meeting 
the objectives of quality and efficiency of justice."294 In early 2016 he also explained the 
advantages of the reform in a couple of interviews he gave to the press, stressing that the 
reform is all about giving the GC the necessary tools to take seriously its role as the "High 
Court of the Union"295, inter alia by enabling deliberation in larger formations than the usual 
three judges.296  
 
After the adoption of Regulation 2015/2422 also President Jaeger has, at least in public, 
overcome his scepticism – which of course is the only feasible way to act for the president of 
the institution concerned. In April 2016 the two presidents spoke together for the press and 
explained the reform. As regards the workload of the GC they pointed out that that even if 
the number of new cases has not increased every year, if you take medians of three years, it is 
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increasing, and that also new policy themes like the Banking Union will lead to increase 
litigation in the GC.297 In the same occasion also Judge Rosas, while understanding the 
critique, stated as his view that in 5-10 years’ time the addition of judges might prove 
adequate.298 
 
Some commentators have also made an effort to see the bright side of the reform and to 
adopt a constructive stance. Sarmiento stated in his blog post following the formal adoption 
of the Regulation 2015/2422 amending the Statute that "the reform is now part of our lives 
and we should start learning how to cope with it, as lawyers, as academics, as judges and as 
civil servants".299 He stressed that if wisely managed, the reform could be the institution’s 
chance to become the “judicial hegemon that many wish the Court to become”. Also, 
according to Weiler, the reform could end up being a “blessing in disguise."300 
 
5.2 The coming years  
 
As the previous section shows, the reform has been subject to unprecedented criticism. 
Irrespective of whether this critique is justified or not, it is a fact. The critics will most 
probably not forget the reform but continue to monitor with a great deal of interest how the 
new resources are used. In addition, Regulation 2015/2422 itself obliges the CJ in its Article 
3(1), with the aid of an external consultant, to draw up a report focusing on the efficiency of 
the GC, the necessity and effectiveness of the increase of judges, the use and effectiveness of 
resources and the further establishment of specialised chambers and/or other structural 
changes. Thus, the scrutiny that the CJEU will face in coming years in the implementation of 
the reform is bound to be intense. This section will shed light on the various matters the 
CJEU will have to consider in the coming years.  
 
                                                             
297 Teffer (2016). 
298 Ahtela (2016).  
299 Sarmiento (2015c).  
300 Weiler (2016).  
67 
 
5.2.1 Statistics under the magnifying glass 
 
It follows from the recitals of Regulation 2015/2422 that the main objectives of the reform 
relate in the first place to reducing the volume of pending cases and the excessive duration of 
proceedings. Thus, although the reform process has painstakingly shown that statistics can be 
interpreted in very different ways301, in the coming years the figures provided by the CJEU 
on its workings will be monitored meticulously. It follows from the aforementioned 
objectives of the reform that the key performance indicators for the reform's success will be 
the number of pending cases as well as the average duration of proceedings.  
 
It is of course way too early to properly measure the success of the reform. It is also valid to 
ask whether 26 December 2020, the dead-line for the report provided for in Article 3 of the 
Regulation 2015/2422, is also too early. The last batch of extra judges will only start their 
work in autumn 2019 and at no point was it even expected that the reform would result in 
immediate positive effects; the challenges brought by such an upheaval of an organ have 
been recognised and it may therefore take even years for the reforms to begin to have any 
positive impact from the parties’ point of view.302 However, a quick glance at the relevant 
statistics is justifiable and provides interesting information even at this point.  
 
As regards the duration of proceedings, the GC clearly has managed to cut down the handling 
times recently. Whereas the average duration of all cases in 2013 was 26.9 months, in 2017 it 
had narrowed down to 16.3 months.303 Whatever the case may be, in competition cases, for 
instance, the fall from 50.5 months in 2011 to 21.6 months in 2017 is remarkable and 
constitutes a major improvement from the point of view of the European economy. Even 
though this tendency of declining handling times has been visible already before the reform 
(in 2015 the average duration had dropped to 20.6 months), and is partly due to the internal 
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measures adopted in the past years as well as the entry into force of the new Rules of 
Procedure304, at least part of it is attributable to the reform.  
 
However, as regards the number of pending cases the effects of the reform do not seem to 
have kicked in yet.305 These figures, retrieved from the Annual Reports of the CJEU of 2013 
and 2017, show the evolution of the key figures as regards the number of cases. 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017 
New cases   568 636 722 617  790  912  831  974  917 
Completed cases 555 527 714 688  702  814  987  755  895 
Pending cases  1 191 1300 1 308 1 237  1 325  1 423  1 267  1 486 1 508 
  
Hence, contrary to the objectives of the reform, the stock of pending cases kept growing also 
in 2016 and 2017. The explanation for this phenomenon is simple: while the number of 
incoming cases keeps increasing, the effectiveness of the GC has not improved much despite 
the arrival of a large number of extra judges. Year 2016 was especially detrimental in this 
respect; whereas the number of incoming cases was 974, the GC only managed to complete 
755 cases. This is quite understandable considering that a total of 22 new judges started to 
work in the house that year.306 In 2017 the ratio was already much better; 917 new and 895 
completed cases. Still, considering that the composition of the GC remained quite stable 
throughout the whole year, with only two new judges, 2017 could have expected to be a more 
productive year and allowed the GC to start reducing the stock of pending cases.  
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One cannot help but notice that whereas in 2015 the GC was able to close an average of 35 
cases per judge307, in 2017 the corresponding figure was only 20 cases.308 The productivity, 
measured this way, in 2017 actually corresponds to 2010, before any of the internal measures 
taken by the GC to enhance its productivity had been launched309 and is quite far from the 
internal target of the GC of 25 cases completed/judge/year.310 Hence, even though the 
individual cases now seem to be dealt with more expeditiously than before, this has strangely 
not resulted in cabinets being able to absorb more cases but quite the contrary.  
 
However, it is fair to wait a couple of years and let the GC find its new ways of working 
before jumping into far-reaching conclusions. President Jaeger states in the Annual Report of 
2017 that 2018 should be the year when the GC will reach its new “cruising speed”.311 The 
figures of the following years will certainly be monitored with great interest, both by 
commentators and by the external expert that will be chosen to draw up the report referred to 
in Regulation 2015/2422.  
 
5.2.2 Internal organisation and case management 
 
When assessing the future of the GC and the success of the reform, one of the most crucial 
questions is how it is going to organise itself internally. As regards internal organisation and 
case management, the doubling of the number of judges opens a wide range of new 
possibilities that should be examined in a constructive and open manner. It seems clear that a 
court consisting of 56 (or 54 after "Brexit") members simply cannot work essentially the 
same way as one consisting of 28 members.312 
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70 
 
 
The GC has obviously already taken some measures of internal organisation to accommodate 
to the new situation. Whereas the GC until September 2016 was composed of three judge 
chambers, it now consists of nine five-judge chambers (which can sit either with five judges 
or with two sub-formations of three judges).313 The purpose of this change is to enhance the 
use of five judge chambers, even though a chamber sitting with three judges still remains the 
ordinary formation of the GC.314 This novelty will certainly result in enhancing the quality 
and the legitimacy of the work of the GC, but this might take some time. The GC is used to 
working in three-judge chambers and deliberating in a larger chamber always signifies a 
more complicated and lengthy decision-making process.315 Also, the exact criteria for 
allocating a case to a five-judge chamber are still unclear. 
 
In addition, some measures relating to internal management of the GC have been carried out, 
especially regarding the vice-president. The GC decided in 2016 to trust him with the task of 
developing a "hub" concentrating on cross-cutting legal analysis with a view to enhancing 
the consistency and quality of the case-law of the GC.316 Moreover, the GC decided that the 
vice-president shall be a member of the grand chamber of the GC317 and that when a judge is 
prevented from acting, the vice-president will replace him.318  
 
However, the most interesting step so far has been the proposal, made by the GC in March 
2018, to amend its Rules of Procedure so as to empower the vice-president to perform the 
functions of advocate general.319 This would be a historic change, as even though the Treaties 
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have always allowed for the GC to be assisted by advocates general320 this provision has 
practically remained a dead letter.321 At the time of the establishment of the CFI, the CJ was 
of the opinion that permanent advocates general were not necessary because the intended role 
of this court was limited to special categories of cases and hence, did not include 
"development of EU law".322 This reasoning obviously is no longer valid.  
 
Even though the Nice Treaty did away with the compulsory use of an advocate general in 
every case in the CJ323, their crucial role in cases posing new and difficult questions of law is 
widely recognised.324 Their added value has been neatly summarised by the Advocate 
General Van Gerven according to whom an advocate general not only shows the way in 
which he believes that the Court should follow, but also plays a role in clarifying the Court's 
case law to the advantage of the legal community as a whole and makes it more transparent 
and democratic.325 The opinion of an advocate general contains a more detailed exposition of 
the factual and legal background of the case than the judgment and can even include 
contemplations concerning different possibilities for a solution and alternative arguments or a 
comparative analysis of the laws of Member States.326  
 
Hence, it would seem only logical to start assigning an advocate general in the most 
interesting and important cases also in the GC, especially as the GC now is committed to 
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enhancing the overall quality of its judicial work.327 If infringement cases would be 
transferred to the GC, as recently proposed by the CJ (see infra, section 5.2.3), the 
introduction of advocates general in the GC could also add the legitimacy of the decision 
making and thus, make it easier for Member States to accept the transfer of competence.  
 
However, the inevitable question is whether the current proposal is a bit too modest. Why not 
institutionalise the system once and for all and to nominate several judges to act (solely) as 
advocates general? Also, although the possibility of the vice-president acting as advocate 
general might seem a good idea from the perspective of preserving the uniformity of 
jurisprudence, this solution does not sit well with the requirement of "complete impartiality 
and independence" of an advocate general, provided for in second paragraph of Article 252 
TFEU. As Tridimas has stated, the independence of an advocate general from judges is of a 
cardinal importance.328 Hence, nominating certain “ordinary” judges to perform the task of 
an advocate general for a longer period of time and to free those persons temporarily from 
duties of judge would seem a preferable solution.329  
 
One of the hot topics related to the internal organisation is specialisation inside the GC. This 
is a question that has been discussed for long, much before this reform was launched.330 The 
Commission pleaded for specialisation already in its guidelines concerning the establishment 
of the CFI in 1988 where it suggested both for the creation of two specialised chambers (for 
economic and staff cases respectively) and for the recruitment of judges specialised in these 
areas.331 This proposal was logical considering that the CFI in the beginning was a specialist 
court with competence only on these two areas. However, also different commentators have 
throughout the years called for at least a discussion on possible specialisation inside the 
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"able to approach a case with the necessary degree of objectivity and detachment if called upon to act as an 
Advocate General". See Arnull (2006), p. 27. 
329 Tridimas (1997), p. 1385.  
330 See e.g the Due report, pp. 49−50 and Azizi (2006), p. 246.  
331 See SEC(88)366 final, Preliminary guidelines adopted by the Commission for the preparation of an opinion 
on the proposal put forward by the Court of Justice for a Council decision establishing a Court of First Instance 
(CFI) and amending the statutes of the Court of Justice, 18.5.1988. 
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GC.332 Nevertheless, apart from the Appeal Chamber devoted for the examination of appeals 
from the CST there has really been no response to such propositions in the GC itself.  
 
With the reform this discussion has reached a new level and some have stated that in a 
judiciary consisting of 56 judges the creation of specialised chambers would not only be a 
noteworthy possibility but a necessity.333 It has been maintained that specialisation of 
chambers would facilitate a flexible management and a thorough review of, in particular, 
difficult and lengthy cases.334 The most eager advocate has been the Commission that has 
persistently been insisting this question in a manner that some have found even intrusive and 
insolent.335 Already in its first opinion concerning the reform in 2011 the Commission 
proposed adding in the Statute a paragraph according to which the GC would be obliged to 
create at least two specialised chambers. This would, according to the Commission, have 
ensured in the situation of 12 extra judges a more efficient and rapid handling of cases, while 
preserving the necessary flexibility.336 In its opinion concerning the transfer of jurisdiction 
from the CST to the GC in 2016337 the Commission took opportunity to note that "[i]t goes 
without saying that the way the General Court functions will have to be profoundly modified 
to cope with this new situation" and called for "reflection on the possibilities of adapting the 
rules and practices governing the allocation of cases by creating thematic synergies". These 
openings, that gained some support also among the Member States, are reflected in Article 
3(1) of Regulation 2015/2422 that explicitly lists the creation of specialised chambers as one 
of the issues to be considered in the name of efficiency in the report that is to be drafted in 
2020.  
                                                             
332 See e.g. the interventions of the Agent of the Swedish Government, Anna Falk and of the President of the 
CCBE delegation to the CJ, Onno Brouwer in the Colloqium "Celebration of 20 years of the Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities - From 20 to 2020, building the CFI of tomorrow on solid foundations". 
333 Sarmiento (2015c). See also the letter of the Registrar of the CJ, Alfredo Calot Escobar, sent to the Council 
presidency in 2011, according to which “it is likely that specialisation of chambers is inherent in a court 
composed of 39 Judges” (in Council doc. 16904/2011, p. 7).  
334 Öberg, Ali and Sabouret (2018), pp. 218−219. 
335 See Dehousse (2016a), p. 17 and speech of President Jaeger in the CCBE conference (CCBE, Proceedings 
of the Conference “EU Courts – Looking Forward”). 
336 Commission opinion of 30.9.2011 on the requests for the amendment of the Statute of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, presented by the Court, COM(2011) 596 final, paragraphs 35-37. 
337 Commission opinion on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
transfer to the General Court of the European Union of jurisdiction at first instance in disputes between the 
Union and its servants, COM/2016/081 final.  
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Although the CJ has traditionally been cautious in not interfering with the internal 
organisation of the GC, it has also referred to this possibility. In its original proposal the CJ 
underlined the need to reflect, at the same time with the addition of judges, how to make the 
best use of all the GC's resources, "perhaps through specialisation of certain chambers and 
flexible case management allocation"338 and Registrar Calot Escobar recognised in his letter 
addressed to the Council presidency in November 2011 that specialisation is one factor of 
efficiency. In its upgraded proposal of 2014 the CJ also hinted to the existence of this 
possibility by listing in the reasoning of its proposal that through the proposed amendments 
the GC would have "greater flexibility in dealing with cases, since the General Court will be 
able, in the interests of the proper administration of justice, […] to make certain Chambers 
responsible for hearing and determining cases falling within certain subject areas".339 
 
However, the potential downsides of specialisation have also been debated at length 
throughout the years. These include inter alia the reduction of flexibility in the allocation of 
cases to chambers340 and the fact that as there is lots of cross-fertilization in the law 
governing different areas, the unity and the consistency of the jurisprudence could be 
weakened.341 The potential lack of perspective of judges assigned in specialised chambers 
and the compatibility of the system with the principle of "juge légal" have also been brought 
up, as well as the practical argument that Member States might not accept a system where 
their judge might not participate in the handling competition cases, considered generally to 
be the most important ones.342 Moreover, there would be practical difficulties in creating 
specialised chambers in a court in which stability is not guaranteed and the appointments can 
be politically-influenced.343 Even the humane argument that it might be boring for the judges 
                                                             
338 Doc. 8787/11, p. 10. 
339 Doc. 14448/11, p. 5. 
340 An EU Competition Court: report with evidence, House of Lords: European Union Committee, 15th report 
of session 2006-07, paragraph 201. 
341 See Celebration of 20 years of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities 25 September 2009, 
the speech of Anthony M. Collins, SC, Bar of Ireland and Dehousse (2011), p. 25. 
342 "An EU Competition Court: report with evidence", 15th report of session 2006-07, paragraphs 113-122 and 
Sarmiento (2017), p. 243.  
343 Sarmiento (2017), p. 243. 
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to "face the same issues day in and day out" has been raised in the discussion.344 
Consequently, judges could be attracted to take turns between the “fun” chambers and the 
“boring” chambers in which case the référendaires could become attached to specialised 
chambers instead of judges to ensure certain stability in the case law. This in turn might raise 
the question of who is ultimately running the place.345 
 
The GC itself has been very cautious and tends to refer in this context to the use of the 
"connection criterion", according to which even though the cases are usually assigned to 
chambers following a system of rotation, the president may derogate from the rotas in order 
to take account of a connection between cases or with a view to ensuring an even spread of 
the workload.346  Although this criterion has been given a broad interpretation347, it has to be 
stressed that this arrangement is not transparent and that its use is completely in the 
discretion of the President.  
 
President Jaeger stated politely in 2015 that the specialisation of chambers is "a work in 
progress" and assured that there is "fruitful discussion among the members".348 Nevertheless, 
simultaneously some members of the GC have expressed in public critical views towards any 
form of formalised specialisation.349 Thus, it comes as no surprise that the GC made an 
internal decision not to introduce a system of specialisation of chambers, at least for the 
moment, and has opted for a system which would allow for individual judges to assume 
expertise in certain areas.350  
 
                                                             
344 Celebration of 20 years of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities 25 September 2009, the 
speech of Anthony M. Collins, SC, Bar of Ireland. 
345 Sarmiento (2015c). 
346 Criteria for the assignment of cases to Chambers, OJ 2016 C 296, p. 2. 
347 Doc. 16904/2011, Draft amendments to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and to 
Annex I thereto - Observations made by the Court of Justice in connection with the proceedings of the Council's 
Working Party on the Court of Justice on 14 October 2011, 14.11.2011, p. 6. 
348 Jaeger (2017), p. 37. 
349 See e.g. Dehousse (2016a), pp. 59−60. Judge Dehousse states that specialisation is precluded by both by the 
existence of a generalist court and the manner in which it is composed and refers to Judge van der Woude who 
has warned against the risk of politisation of the distribution of judicial portfolios. 
350 Sarmiento (2017), p. 242. 
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Finally, in addition to the notorious changes in the administrative services351, attention is 
drawn to the special report published by the European Court of Auditors (hereinafter: ECA) 
in October 2017, consisting of a performance review of case management at the CJEU.352 
The report contained a series of considerations the aim of which is to improve the 
effectiveness of the case management of the CJEU, most of which the latter agreed to at least 
examine.353 The suggestions include developing a system in which performance is measured 
on a case by case basis by reference to a tailored time-frame; allowing more flexibility in the 
allocation of référendaires; raising awareness of Member States as regards the importance of 
the timely nomination and appointment of judges; changing the rule according to which 
French is the only deliberation language and implementing a fully integrated IT system.354 
Even though the reform as such was left outside the scope of the report (as it was still 
ongoing), many of the recommendations and suggestions included therein are pertinent in the 
implementation of the reform and definitely merit to be considered. 
 
5.2.3 Division of competence between the two courts 
 
Even though the reform technically only touches the GC (and the late CST) it will without a 
doubt have an impact also on the CJ, as well as the institution CJEU as a whole. It has been 
clear from the outset that the reform will result in some shifts of competences between the 
two courts; primarily from the CJ to the GC, but possibly also vice versa. However, a 
detailed examination of the different types of action and the consequences and limitations of 
their potential transfer has proved that this might be easier said than done.  
 
                                                             
351 In the foreword of the Annual Report 2017 President Lenaerts explains that the administrative services of the 
institution have been reorganised so as to bring about considerable synergies (Annual Report of the CJEU 2017, 
p. 11). 
352 European Court of Auditors, Special Report: Performance review of case management at the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (2017, N:o 14).  
353 The comments of the CJEU can be found at the end of the ECA report. 
354 The ECA report, p. 48.  
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The partial transfer of jurisdiction from the CJ to the GC to handle preliminary references 
has been subject of discussion ever since the establishment of the CFI355 even though the 
necessary legal basis was only introduced by the Nice Treaty. Although many have 
considered this to be a natural and even inevitable development already before the reform356, 
no serious consideration has been given to this possibility as to date. After the entry into 
force of the Nice Treaty the institutions were busy setting up and getting into action of the 
CST. And lately, the workload situation of the GC has made it quite impossible to even 
consider such a transfer.357  
 
However, the fact remains that this body of cases forms by far the biggest group in the CJ 
and the number of references is constantly increasing.358 Hence, it seemed quite logical for 
the legislator to stipulate for the CJ to draw up a report on possible changes to the 
distribution of competence for preliminary rulings under Article 267 TFEU soon after the 
entry into force of the reform.359 Many commentators have supported such a transfer360 and 
also President Jaeger has stated that transferring part of preliminary references to the GC and 
thus, giving it interpretative competence, is the will of the legislator.361 
 
However, the issue is not that simple. The importance of preliminary references is certainly 
not only quantitative. The CJ has in its opinion 2/13, concerning accession of the EU to the 
ECHR, described the preliminary ruling procedure as the keystone of judicial system of the 
EU which has the object of securing uniform interpretation of EU law, "thereby serving to 
                                                             
355 For instance, Jacqué and Weiler stated as early as in 1990 that the handling of minor preliminary references 
is a very wasteful and inefficient way to employ the time of the CJEC and suggested that only questions 
referred by highest courts would stay within the CJEC. See Jacqué and Weiler (1990), 190-192. After the entry 
into force of the Nice Treaty Vesterdorf stated, for the same reason, that the possibility of a partial transfer 
should be used as soon as possible. See Vesterdorf (2003), pp. 314−315. 
356 See e.g. Azizi (2006) and Lotarski (2004), who suggested that preliminary references might in the future be 
even handled by special tribunals (p. 721). 
357 See e.g. written evidence of Advocate General Sharpston (appendix 5) in report "The Workload of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union" of the House of Lords' European Union Committe. 
358 Whereas in 2007 there were 265 new preliminary references, in 2012 the corresponding figure was already 
404 and in 2017 a total of 533, which represents a 13% increase on the previous record set in 2016 (see the 
Annual Report 2016 as well as the press release No 36/2018 of the CJEU, Luxembourg, 23 March 2018). 
359 Article 3(2) of Regulation 2015/2422. 
360 See e.g. Alemanno and Pech (2017), pp. 174−175, Weiler (2016) and Sarmiento (2015c).  
361 See e.g. Jaeger (2017), pp. 17−18. 
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ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the particular 
nature of the law established by the Treaties".362 Also, although some of the preliminary 
references are very technical, the fact remains that most of the important landmark judgments 
developing the legal system of the EU have been made in preliminary reference cases.  
 
Hence, it was not a surprise that in its report provided for in Regulation 2015/2422363 , the CJ 
came to the conclusion that there is no need to propose such a transfer, at least for the 
moment. The report examines both pros (such as balancing of the workloads of the two 
courts) and cons (such as the difficulties in defining the areas to be transferred and the risk of 
divergent approaches in the case-law of the CJ and the GC) and stresses that the CJ is for the 
time being coping well with its workload and has managed to keep the handling times of 
preliminary references fairly reasonable.364 However, the CJ admitted that at some point the 
upward trend in the number of preliminary references may revive the question of a partial 
transfer of jurisdiction.  
 
As if to compensate its reluctance to transfer of preliminary references, the CJ in its report 
hints to possible other alterations to the distribution of competence. The concrete result was 
revealed in March 2018 when the CJ gave a proposal to amend the Statute so as to, inter alia, 
transfer to the GC the partial jurisdiction in infringement proceedings.365 In its reasoning the 
CJ is pointing out that the GC nowadays has the competence in most of the direct actions. 
According to the CJ, dealing with infringement cases requires detailed analysis of both the 
facts and circumstances behind the action and of the precise scope of the national legislation 
or practice at issue, similar to the examination the GC is accustomed to conduct. Thus, the 
GC seems particularly well placed to hear and determine infringement actions. However, 
actions based on a failure to comply with the TEU, Title V of Part Three of the TFEU (the 
                                                             
362 Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, p. 176.  
363 Report of the Court of Justice on possible changes to the distribution of competence for preliminary rulings 
under Article 267 TFEU, in Council doc. 15995/17.  
364 This is indeed true, as according to the latest statistics the average duration of proceedings in preliminary 
references in 2017 was only 15.7 months. 
365 Amendments to Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in Council doc. 
7586/1/18. 
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area of freedom, security and justice) or an act adopted on the basis of the latter, would stay 
in the CJ, as well as actions which can lead to monetary sanctions.366  
 
It remains to be seen what kind of a welcome the proposal of the CJ will receive. Even 
though infringement cases quite seldom raise general interest or, even more seldom, contain 
great questions of EU law, they can be politically very sensitive for the Member State in 
question and thus, better suited for the CJ at least from the Member States' perspective. The 
Commission might also prefer, if not for reasons of expediency and procedural economy, 
keeping the infringement cases in the competence of the CJ and avoiding the appeal 
procedure. In addition, the number of new infringement actions has been in steep decline 
lately. Whereas the total number of new infringement actions in 2007 was 212, in 2012 there 
were only 58 such actions and 2016 a modest 31.367 The Commission gave in the end of 2016 
a communication368 in which it announced that it will be “bigger and more ambitious on big 
things, and smaller and more modest on small things” which means, inter alia, adopting a 
more strategic and efficient approach to enforcement in terms of the handling of 
infringements. If this signifies that number of infringement cases will stay moderate also in 
the future, transferring them would not make a great difference to either of the courts as to 
their case-loads.  
 
5.2.4 Quality of personnel 
 
In an organisation much can be achieved by skilful leadership and by appropriate 
organisational measures. However, if the persons performing the actual assignments are not 
up to the job, the outcome can, at best, only be average. With its new resources the GC has 
all the possibilities to become a success story, but only with the right personnel.  
 
                                                             
366 Actions on the basis of Articles 260(2) and 258 together with 260(3).   
367 In 2017 this number had jumped up to 41, but only the following years will show if this is the beginning of 
an upward trend or a statistical peak. 
368 Communication from the Commission — EU law: Better results through better application, C/2016/8600, OJ 
C 18, 19.1.2017, pp. 10–20. 
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Unlike the other matters discussed above, the quality of judges is not something that the 
CJEU itself can affect. The Member States, with the participation of the Article 255 Panel, 
are responsible for finding the right persons and CJEU can only hope for the best.  
 
The role of the Article 255 Panel in this process is crucial. It has not remained a rubber stamp 
machine but has become an active and serious actor in the process leading to the nomination 
(or as the case may be, rejection) of candidates for judges and advocates general, influencing 
indirectly also the national procedures in several Member States.369 The first president of the 
Article 255 Panel, Jean-Marc Sauvé, stressed in his speech at the CCBE conference in 2014 
the crucial importance of a rigorous application of its task to assess "candidates' suitability to 
perform the duties of Judge", as stipulated in the Article 255 TFEU. He stressed that the 
Committee puts special emphasis on evaluating the ability of a candidate to bring a 
meaningful and effective contribution in handling of cases, in a timely manner.370  
 
The latest (fourth) activity report published by the Article 255 Panel tells that by the end of 
2016, 19.1 % of the opinions it has delivered on candidatures for a first term of office have 
been unfavourable (no unfavourable opinions have been delivered on candidatures for the 
renewal of a term of office).371 Of the six unfavourable opinions delivered by the second 
Article 255 Panel since March 2014, altogether five related to judges of the GC.372 These 
figures show that for some Member States finding candidates meeting the requirements of 
the Treaties, especially for the GC, has been a "painful, excessively long and sometimes even 
humiliating exercise" already before the reform.373 It should also be reminded in this context 
that one of the extra judges of the first phase of the reform is yet to be nominated.374  
                                                             
369 Dumbrovský, Petkova and van der Sluis (2014), pp. 481−482. 
370 Intervention of Jean-Marc Sauvé in CCBE, Proceedings of the Conference “EU Courts – Looking Forward”, 
Brussels, pp. 13–14. 
371 Fourth activity report of the panel provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, published 10 February 2017, p. 14.  
372 See the Fourth Activity report, 11. According to the report, the Panel has delivered unfavourable opinions for 
instance when a candidate's length of high-level professional experience has been manifestly too short, where 
the candidate's legal abilities have been inadequate or his knowledge of European Union law insufficient, or 
when there has been inconsistency between a candidate's statements and the content of his dossier. Also, a 
candidate's integrity and probity might have been questionable.    
373 Abenhaïm (2014a).  
374 See supra section 4.3. 
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Hence, as regards the quality of judges, the ball is in the Member States' court. The Article 
255 Panel cannot be expected to loosen the criteria according to which it examines the 
candidatures. First, these criteria are based on Treaties and secondly, the quality of judges 
must remain on the same level as before the reform. Anything less is unthinkable. Thus, it is 
for every single Member State to put all political and other national aspirations of a similar 
nature aside and concentrate on finding the best possible people meeting the requirements 
provided for in the Treaties. Also, when convening in the format of "representatives of the 
governments of the Member States meeting within the Council" to make the nominations, 
Member States will have to have the courage to follow the opinion of the Article 255 Panel 
and reject a candidate in potential situations (not yet realized) where a Member State would 
wish to defy a negative opinion of the panel. The quality of judges is both a question of 
appearance but also, first and foremost, a factor directly linked to the quality of judicial work. 
Finally, once nominated, a judge should be able to serve the GC for more than one term. By 
changing "its" judge every six years a Member State is disturbing the stability and 
effectiveness of the GC and causing incertitude not only to the judge in question but also to 
his or her cabinet.375  
 
In addition to quality of judges, also the quality of référendaires is vital. Référendaires are 
responsible, under the supervision of judges and advocates general, for the drafting of 
various documents relating to the judicial work of the CJEU. The ECA stated in its 
aforementioned report concerning the management of the CJEU that quality, management 
and availability of référendaires are important factors in ensuring efficient case management 
and that, on the other hand, interruptions in the availability of a référendaire may impact 
adversely on the efficient processing of cases.376 In the survey contained in the report the 
workload of the référendaire responsible for the file figured among the most frequent factors 
affecting the duration of the handling in both courts.377  
 
                                                             
375 Sharpston (2013), pp. 453–454. 
376 ECA Special Report No 14/2017, paragraphs 23-24. 
377 Ibid, figure 7, in p. 31 and figure 8, in p. 32.  
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Up until now there has been no open platform for the recruitment of référendaires and the 
judges have been more or less free in forming their cabinets. There are undoubtedly 
advantages to this system as the relation between a judge and his or her référendaire must be 
one where mutual trust and good personal chemistry exist. However, there has also been 
criticism towards this practice which, together with the requirement of fluent French, results 
in a quite homogeneous body of référendaires where mindsets tend to be harmonised and 
where conflicts of interest are not uncommon.378 It has been submitted that in the new 
situation the GC should introduce greater requirements for recruitment, more transparency in 
the selection process and/or a system based on a list of preselected lawyers for selection by 
the judges. Also, a gradual shift towards a bilingual English/French regime might become 
inevitable379, although this project admittedly comes with several practical problems that 
would have to be overcome.380  
 
5.2.5 Quality of judicial work  
 
With good quality judges and référendaires it is possible for the GC to perform good quality 
judicial work which, alongside clearing the backlog of cases and reducing the length of 
proceedings, is among the aims of the reform. One of the benefits of the reform is that it 
offers the GC, for the first time in many years, the luxury of really concentrating on quality 
rather than quantity.381 The quality of judgments is an extremely manifold issue that cannot 
be treated here more thoroughly. However, it is clear that quality does not start to rise 
automatically just by giving a court more personnel. Quite the contrary, everybody knows 
that if the workload is too low, the performance of the worker might paradoxically even 
decline as result of boredom and loss of motivation.  
 
                                                             
378 See, for instance, Petit (2013). 
379 Sarmiento (2017), pp. 244–245. 
380 See Naômé (2008), pp. 115–116.  
381 Even though the quality of the judicial work of the GC has rarely been seriously questioned it is clear that an 
excessive workload combined with a pressure to produce more in shorter time affects the work of any organ. 
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One quality-related component, much discussed in the context of this reform, is the 
requirement for coherence and consistency of jurisprudence; if the GC starts to give 
incoherent and contradictory judgments its legitimacy is at stake. As explained supra in 
section 5.2.2, the GC has indeed taken measures aiming at preventing this, such as a more 
frequent use of five judge chambers and the tasking of the vice-president to supervise the 
uniformity of the jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the GC should also start using the grand 
chamber for real. Surprisingly, despite the frequent references to the grand chamber in the 
context of the process there has in reality (as of 31 December 2017) been according to the 
annual reports zero cases assigned to the grand chamber during the last five years.382 
Deciding cases in the grand chamber formation would the give the GC more tools to make 
principled decisions and deal with complex constitutional issues, and the quality and the 
legitimacy of its judicial work would most certainly be reinforced.383 It should be stressed 
that in the CJ the grand chamber has become a kind of a quality label marking the importance 
of the case and the authority of the judgment.384 
 
In this context it should also be noted that the CJ has lately leaned more and more towards a 
practice whereby its judgements become very concise and, at the same time, less informative. 
Although it has been claimed that the CJ has in its judgments, since the 1990’s, engaged 
much more with the arguments of the parties385, lately it seems to be reverting back towards 
the original practice whereby judgments were terse, omitting any references to the arguments 
presented to it in written and oral submissions. This regrettable practice, that allows the CJ to 
ignore the arguments running counter to its conclusions, reduces the legitimacy and general 
usefulness of the judgements and sometimes makes them harder to understand, especially as 
dissenting opinions do not exist.386 The GC now has the chance to take the opposite direction 
                                                             
382 Annual Report of the CJEU 2017, p. 216 and p. 221. 
383 Sarmiento (2017), p. 245. 
384 Although the fact that the Member States and institutions have, when they are parties to a case, the right to 
ask for the case to be handled by the grand chamber [Article 16(3) of the Statute]) somewhat inflates this label. 
385 Tridimas (2018), p. 603. 
386 See e.g. Case C-284/16, Achmea. This case concerning arbitral tribunals provided by bilateral investment 
treaties concluded between Member States is of great importance both for the development of EU law and 
politically, considering the ongoing international efforts around investment treaties and the dispute resolution 
related to them. However, in its judgement the CJ concluded in a very concise manner that the tribunals in 
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and start making judgments that not only solve the actual question but also contribute to the 
development of EU law and provide useful information on the background of the solutions 
adopted in the judgment. 
 
5.2.6 The CJEU as an institutional actor 
 
Finally, the lengthy and difficult process leading to the reform has also provoked reflections 
related to the CJEU as an institutional actor. This subject has until now not been discussed 
much, probably because the legislative processes leading to earlier reforms and other 
amendments of the Statute have run quite smoothly from the procedural point of view. 
However, the painful process leading to the latest reform has revived discussion over the 
CJEU as an institutional actor.  
 
First, the role of the CJ in the legislative process has been debated at length in the margins of 
the reform process. The critics have discussed both the central role that Article 281 TFEU 
confines to the judiciary itself when changing its Statute and the fact that inside the CJEU 
only the CJ has a role in the legislative process. Although the GC nowadays in practice is 
involved in the process of preparing changes in the Statute, the CJ can solely decide the 
content of the proposal, as the reform process demonstrated.  
 
Keppenne has written a whole article in which he examines the CJEU as a “norm producer” 
and comes to the conclusion that when assessing the current system in the light of the 
principle of the separation of powers and the principle of institutional independence, there is 
room for improvements, especially as regards the active involvement of judges in the 
legislative process when changing the Statute.387 Alemanno and Pech, for their part, devoted 
in their article of 2017 several pages for the examination of the administrative relationship of 
the two courts, distorted for the advantage of the CJ.388 Judge Dehousse, for his part, states 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
question breached the autonomy of EU law, without summarising the arguments of the Parties of the 16 
Member States participating in the proceedings and thus, without addressing the counter-arguments.  
387 Keppenne (2017). 
388 Alemanno and Pech (2017), pp. 167−172.  
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that this provision creates a "dangerous confusion of powers that will always generate serious 
tensions in a system that is purportedly grounded upon the principle of the separation of 
powers", referring in also to an interview in which President Lenaerts at least implicitly 
seems to admit the shortcomings of the system.389 According to Dehousse, the best solution 
would be to simply repeal the legislative initiative of the CJ and the second best option to 
attribute this competence to the institution as a whole and not one of its constituent courts. In 
a similar vein, Alemanno and Pech have talked about the "rather unorthodox possibility laid 
down in EU primary law, which allowed in this instance the judicial branch to initiate the 
legislative process with the view of securing additional resources for itself" and illustrated 
the problems related to Article 281 TEFU by highlighting certain defects occurred during the 
reform process.390 They also criticize the fact that the exercise of administrative and 
legislative powers of the institution is concentrated in the hands of the president of the CJ and 
the weekly réunion générale.391 
 
Secondly, also the fact that the president of the CJ is at the same time the president of the 
whole institution has been discussed, as well as the vast powers of the president. Alemanno 
and Pech have stated that the possibility for the CJ and its president to take decisions and 
make proposals without meaningfully engaging the GC raises questions both as regards the 
representative nature of the CJEU’s administrative decisions and their legitimacy.392 In 
addition, although the legacy and the many achievements of President Skouris have been 
widely acknowledged393 and President Lenaerts has been described as being, among many 
other positive attributes, “a natural consensus-builder”, it has been recognised that the 
situation where the president of the CJ is at the same time the president of the CJEU is apt to 
cause conflicts.394 Also, Sarmiento has speculated that a president of the institution, elected 
                                                             
389 Dehousse (2016a) p. 67 and fn 144. 
390 Alemanno and Pech (2017), pp. 146−147. 
391 Alemanno and Pech (2017), pp. 166−169. The general meeting, commonly referred to with its French name 
“reunion générale” gathers all Mambers of the CJ and, according to Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Court of Justice, makes inter alia the decisions concerning the administrative issues.   
392 Alemanno and Pech (2017), p. 168. 
393 See e.g. Sarmiento (2015a).  
394 Sarmiento (2015c). 
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solely by the judges of the CJ, might in the future have a tough time with a GC consisting of 
56 members, at least if he does not have the same leadership qualities as the current one.395 
  
 
6 Conclusions 
 
There is no denying that the reform has several shortcomings. Even though some of the 
critique summarised in section 5.1 seems exaggerated396 or unfounded397, the number of new 
judges is indeed excessive. The need to add as many as 28 (or 21) judges has never really 
been demonstrated in light of statistics, the evolution of the workload of the GC has been 
more moderate than initially portrayed398 and, in addition, the GC managed to enhance its 
effectiveness remarkably right before the reform. This is something that is generally hard to 
swallow; the risk of wasting public money and having highly remunerated judges sitting in 
their offices with nothing to do is considered much bigger a sin than those judges having too 
much work. The global financial and economic crisis that has touched all Member States, 
forcing many of them to undertake drastic measures hitting the personnel of the public sector, 
certainly makes the comparison even more striking. Moreover, the abolishment of the CST 
and at the same time the three-level court system is a loss, notwithstanding the practical 
problems related to the appointments in the CST. And the process through which the reform 
was adopted can certainly not be used in the future as an example of good legislative 
practice.  
                                                             
395 Sarmiento (2015c). 
396 The theory of Alemanno and Pech according to which striving for better quality was purely an ex post 
rationale invented by President Lenaerts [Alemanno and Pech (2017), pp. 157–159] does not seem justified. For 
instance, the presidency document of 2014 entitled “Reform of the General Court - Way forward”, forming the 
basis of the political agreement on the reform as it stands, states in its paragraph 10 that the increase would have 
a positive impact on the quality of the judgments of the GC (doc. 16576/14). 
397 For instance, the claims that the is no legal basis for the abolishment of a special tribunal seem petty and 
theoretical. It seems that the right to abolish an existing special tribunal is implicitly included in the legal basis 
without it being necessary for the legal basis to read that the Council and the European Parliament “may 
establish and abolish specialised courts”. Actually, the provision of TEU 19 according to which the CJEU “shall 
include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts” seems more problematic from this point 
of view.  
398 For instance, the text of the proposal of 2011 predicted that further litigation will be generated by the 
application of the REACH Regulation. However, during the past 5 years there have been only 3 to 9 new cases 
related to REACH Regulation per year. Annual Report of the CJEU 2017, p. 213. 
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It is important to note that very little of this all is attributed to the CJEU itself but to the 
legislator. However, the complications did not stem from the participation of the European 
Parliament in the ordinary legislative procedure, as could perhaps been expected, but were 
first and foremost attributable to the Member States whose power struggle led the CJEU into 
an impasse from which the only way out was the doubling of the number of judges.399 First, 
had the Member States been able to agree on a method of distributing a reasonable number of 
posts of extra judges among themselves, the number of judges could have been set exactly to 
the level considered appropriate and necessary. Secondly, the recurrent problems regarding 
the nationality of judges to be nominated to the CST by the Member States made it easy to 
motivate why the CST should be abolished although its work was generally praised. In 
summary, as Abenhaïm has stated, it is "a shame that in 2014, more than 55 years after the 
Treaty of Rome, member states still seem to perceive EU judges as mere guardians of their 
sovereign prerogatives".400  
 
However, the reform is a reality and it is time to focus on something more constructive than 
listing its flaws. The relevant question obviously is whether the procedural and substantive 
shortcomings of the reform mean that it is deemed to be a failure, now and forever. Or could 
the CJEU manage to turn the reform if not into a glaring success story, at least a legitimate 
improvement of the CJEU system?  
 
Even though it is way too early to draw definitive conclusions, the figures from last year 
seem to indicate that something is not working. Although the reform has already had a 
positive impact on handling times and although according to President Jaeger the GC will 
reach its "new cruising speed" only in 2018, the fact is that the productivity per judge has 
                                                             
399 In practice the only alternative option was "no reform" and it does not seem probable that a solution based on 
adding only référendaires and administrative personnel, as suggested by some would have sufficed to clear the 
backlog of cases and to shorten the handling times while maintaining the quality, as well as to ensure all this 
also in the future. First, the backlog of cases was (and still is) large and, if we believe the CJEU, the workload is 
likely to rise and secondly, even if each cabinet would have an army of référendaires, there is only so much one 
judge can digest. Even though the GC had managed to enhance its effectiveness as regards the number of 
completed cases, in 2015 the duration of proceedings was still unacceptably long (in competition cases, for 
instance, the average handling time was 49.3 months).  
400 Abenhaïm (2014a). 
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dropped considerably and the stock of pending cases keeps rising. As in 2019 the GC will see 
the arrival of yet 9 more judges, it is possible that the productivity per judge will drop even 
further. Hence, it seems that the future success of the reform is in the hands of the CJEU 
itself. It must be ready to, funnily enough, reform in order to properly benefit from the 
reform.  
 
First, as stated earlier in section 5.2.3, there should be transfers of jurisdiction from the CJ to 
the GC. This is essential for a more even distribution of the total workload of the CJEU, 
which in turn enables the institution as a whole to use its overall resources in the best and 
most effective way possible. At the moment it seems that the partial transfer of competence 
to give preliminary rulings would make more sense than giving the GC the power to rule on 
infringement actions.  
 
The main reasons for this are that because of their small numbers the transfer of infringement 
actions would not have sufficient impact on the workload of the respective courts, and that 
their transfer would entail prolongation of the infringement procedure, something that is 
detrimental to the efficiency of EU law and the rights of the citizens. Preliminary references, 
on the other hand, represent a considerable proportion of the workload of the CJ.401 The 
criteria for the transfer could be either formal (for instance leaving to the CJ references made 
on by the highest national courts and references questioning the validity of an act402), or 
substantive (transferring to the GC references concerning certain areas such as value added 
tax, custom duties and trademarks). It should also be stressed that the CJ could always handle 
an individual case if the GC considers that it requires a decision of principle likely to affect 
the unity or consistency of union law or if there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of 
Union law being affected.403 This is why the reasoning of the CJ according to which any case 
might contain questions of principle or questions of a cross-cutting nature does not seem 
sufficiently convincing to outweigh the benefits of transfer in an area where long experience 
has shown that the great majority of cases are very technical.  
                                                             
401 In 2017, for instance, preliminary references represented 72 % of all new cases (Annual Report of the CJEU 
2017, p. 102).  
402 Arnull (2018), pp. 13−14. 
403 Articles 256(2) and 256(3) TFEU. 
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However, in order to genuinely invest in both efficiency and quality, the GC should also have 
a serious look at the creation of specialised chambers and the proper introduction of the 
advocate general institution. In addition, in view of future needs, it might be helpful to amend 
the provisions governing the legislative process as regards changing the Statute. 
 
First, as regards specialised chambers, the distribution and the handling of cases in an 
adequate manner and ensuring the coherence of the jurisprudence in a 56-member court 
where all judges and all chambers in principle treat all kinds of cases seems extremely 
laborious and very ineffective. Also, the application of the famous "connection criterion" 
becomes more and more difficult as the number of judges and the number of cases rise. 
Creating a clear, transparent and predictable system of distributing judges (and cases) into 
different chambers, including the grand chamber (the use of which the GC should 
commence) and several different specialist chambers, would also help to remedy the 
potential factual inequality between judges coming from different Member States404 and 
hence, enhance the collegiality of judges, something that is hard to maintain in a 56-member 
court.  
 
As explained supra in section 5.2.2, there are also counter-arguments to the creation of 
special chambers. However, no solution is perfect and the arguments opposing specialist 
chambers do not seem insurmountable. Many of them actually relate to the situation where 
there would only be one judge per Member State405 and, in any case, the advantages of 
specialisation are outweighed by its benefits.406 It is important to note that unlike some critics 
seem to think, creating specialised chambers does not go hand in hand with the recruitment 
of specialised judges.407 Full-fledged specialisation would of course necessitate recruiting 
specialists. However, one could also think of a system of "light specialisation" in which 
                                                             
404 On inequality between judges after the latest big enlargement see Dumbrovsky (2011), pp. 25−28. 
405 See, for instance, "An EU Competition Court: report with evidence", 15th report of session 2006-07, 
paragraph 201. 
406 See also Öberg, Ali and Sabouret (2018), pp. 222−223. 
407 See also the letter of the Registrar of the CJ, sent to the Council presidency in November 2011, according to 
which “specialisation of chambers must not be confused with specialisation of Judges” (in Council doc. 
16904/2011, p. 7). 
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specified chambers would only handle certain types of cases, even though the judges 
assigned to it might not originally be specialists in that area of law.408 The judges of the 
chamber would soon gain in-depth experience through work and the chamber would create 
an institutional memory of its own, ensuring a more effective handling of cases and the 
development of a coherent body of jurisprudence despite the gradual replacement of its 
judges. A natural candidate for areas that could be transferred to specialised chambers is – in 
addition to the notorious staff cases – intellectual property.409 Cases representing this subject-
matter have at least for the past ten years steadily represented around 30-40 % of the GC's 
caseload.410 Also state aid and competition are areas that could be directed to a specialised 
chamber, as well as the growing area of banking and finance. 411 
 
Secondly, the genuine introduction of the advocate general institution, instead of the 
possibility of nominating the vice-president to act as one, should definitely be considered. 
Although the use of advocates general comes with a little longer handling times412, this 
should not be a big problem as the GC now has the necessary tools to efficiently manage its 
handling times in general. Assigning an advocate general for the most important cases would 
add the legitimacy of the judicial work of the GC and bring it one step closer to the CJ, as 
regards its nature. Moreover, nominating for instance eight judges to act as advocates general 
would also help in solving the (plausible) problem of there being simply too many judges and 
too little work.413 
 
Thirdly, next time the Treaties are “opened” in an IGC, serious consideration should be given 
to the possible changes in the decision-making procedures related to amendments of the 
                                                             
408 This kind of a system was proposed already in 2000 in the Due report (pp. 49−50), according to which 
"[s]pecialisation of this kind does not mean that the Judges themselves must become specialised: the Members 
of the specialised Chambers must remain full Members of the Court of First Instance, having received the same 
training and having been appointed on the same terms as their colleagues. Moreover, the assignment of a Judge 
to a specialised Chamber should not normally be on a permanent basis." 
409 See Jaeger (2017), pp. 18−19 and Sarmiento (2015c). 
410 Annual Report of the CJEU 2017, p. 211 and Annual Report of the CJEU 2012, p. 182. 
411 Annual Report of the CJEU 2017, the text by President Jaeger, p. 138 and the statistics, p. 210.  
412 For instance, in the Annual Report 2015 the possibility of giving judgment without the opinion of an 
advocate general is mentioned among the measures through which the CJ has managed to gain efficiency and to 
expedite the handling of cases (Annual Report of the CJEU 2015, p. 9). 
413 See e.g. Hirst (2016) and Alemanno (2017). 
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Statute (see supra section 5.2.6); perhaps the legislative process had been more 
straightforward and the tensions smaller had the involvement of the court itself been lesser 
and the proposals prepared in a more neutral composition. 
 
In addition to these well-known and much-debated options there are certainly also a range of 
other ideas that the CJEU could explore. What is needed is an open mind and readiness to 
find and implement new and innovative ways to organise the administration of justice. The 
CJEU should start a process of ambitious brainstorming in which also the academia, the 
representatives of the users of the courts and other stakeholders could contribute in a modern, 
transparent manner. This would help to improve the CJEU system as a whole and benefit the 
legal subjects. It could possibly even enhance the legitimacy of the reform process ex post. 
The CJEU now has a “million-dollar" chance to make its constitutive courts excel both in 
effectiveness and quality, but it takes an extra effort.  
 
Be that as it may, this hardly remains the last reform in the continuum of modifications of the 
structure of the CJEU. If this reform proves not to be a success – or even if it does – we can 
trust that the present structure is not cast in stone. There will be modifications also in the 
future.  
 
Not surprisingly, there has already been discussion about returning to the three-layer 
system.414 In addition, many commentators have throughout the years predicted that the CJ 
will eventually become a genuine constitutional court, concentrating only on most important 
cases of a constitutional nature and those that may jeopardize the unity and consistency of 
EU law, and the big bulk of more mundane cases will be left to the GC.415 This is actually the 
trend we are witnessing today, although the CJ still resembles more a supreme court than an 
exclusively constitutional court.416 Some have even speculated that it might at some point be 
opportune for reasons related to cohesion and collegiality to reduce the size of the CJ so as to 
allow it to genuinely concentrate on controlling the uniform interpretation of EU law and to 
                                                             
414 Dehousse (2018), pp. 29−30.  
415 See for example Lotarski (2004), pp. 721−723, Jacqué ja Weiler (1990), pp. 190−191, Scorey (1996), p. 231 
and Jacobs (2013), p. 51. 
416 Vesterdorf (2006), p. 607. 
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sit in plenary session417, which still in the 1990’s was frequent practice.418 Others have 
envisioned an even more radical restructuring towards a decentralised system composed of 
regional courts419 that could perhaps be specialised.420 Who knows, maybe one day. 
However, at least for the foreseeable future the CJEU remains firmly placed in its native 
Luxembourg, the plateau of Kirchberg.  
 
                                                             
417 See Iannone (2005), p. 163 and Rosas (2004).  
418 Edward (2004), pp. 126−127. 
419 See Rodriguez Iglesias (2013), pp. 47−48, Jacqué and Weiler (1990), pp. 192−195 and Arnull (1994), p. 
316. 
420 Van Gerven (1996), p. 218. 
